Transcript 0:00 [radio static] What is nationalism, huh? [singing] The Brazil is fait por nós. Peace comes to those who love the same soil. Defense of the nation, patriotism, the guarantee of national sovereignty. 0:16 The military and civilians who overthrew João Goulart from the federal government in 1964, held the Brazilian flag to justify their seizure of power and their stay there for more than two decades. 0:31 According to them, overthrowing a democratically elected president was necessary to save Brazil from Soviet communism, which had arrived in the Americas through Fidel Castro's socialist regime in Cuba. 0:44 As part of their patriotic mission, however, uniformed commanders and politicians didn't see a problem with sharing their strategies with the United States, even exposing Brazil to American armed intervention. 1:00 In turn, the global superpower backed dictatorships in the region in the name of preserving freedom and combating what it saw as anti-American nationalism. 1:11 The spiral of contradictions on both sides made the joint coup attempt possible, but also produced a series of tensions during the generals' period in power. 1:21 [radio static] Warm and friendly relations with the people of Brazil. Count on the armed forces for democracy and freedom. 1:32 My name is Isabella Cruz, and this is the second episode of the special miniseries, Love It or Leave It: The Brazilian Military Dictatorship From Within to Abroad. 1:47 [radio static] After giving an overview of the military dictatorship in episode one, now we are going to dive into the international connections of the Brazilian regime, starting with its focus on the United States and that country's participation in the coup. 2:04 It all started years before the Brazilian military put tanks on the streets on March 31st, 1964. 2:13 Under the coordination of the American Ambassador in Rio de Janeiro, Lincoln Gordon, several actions by the United States since the John F. Kennedy government sought to undermine the Goulart administration. 2:26 Overestimating the Communist threat was in the interest of geopolitical calculations, and some episodes didn't help the Brazilian president either. 2:36 For example, in 1962, less than two years before the coup, documents found with a representative of the Cuban government after he died in a plane crash, showed that Goulart's government itself had discovered that Fidel Castro had sent weapons and manuals of guerrilla warfare to the peasant leagues in the interior of Brazil. 2:59 Not only did the Brazilian government find out that this took place, they kept it a secret. The CIA Ambassador Lincoln Gordon exploited that revelation to the fullest. 3:11 The tremors continued to pile up, and in March 1964, the US's putschist strategy moved to the military field. 3:20 That month, Lyndon Johnson's government was the first to recognize General Humberto Castelo Branco as the new Brazilian president after mobilizing the US Navy and Air Force in support of the Brazilian military, which had just seized power by force. 3:38 [upbeat music] [applause] Delirious applause when it was announced that the vote had reached the necessary two-thirds of the present quorum to guarantee the election. 3:48 This vote was uttered precisely from the bench of Minas Gerais. General Humberto de Alencar Castelo Branco is now the new President of the Republic. 3:59 In terms of party politics, the erosion of Goulart's government occurred with the help of a lot of money. 4:06 First, through the Alliance for Progress, a program that sought to develop Latin American countries in order to shield them from revolutionary influence. 4:16 The Kennedy government financed Brazilian state administrations that opposed Goulart, such as those in Minas Gerais, São Paulo, and Rio de Janeiro. 4:25 An ideological index was created to decide who should get funding and how much they should receive. 4:33 In 1962 elections, the United States also financed candidacies for Congress that could stand in the way of Goulart's bills. 4:42 More than that, American companies and the CIA itself financed extra-partisan ideological propaganda groups, such as the Brazilian Institute of Democratic Action. 4:53 Conservative propaganda showed up in magazines, radio and television programs, and even movie theaters. The Institute also illegally financed hundreds of electoral campaigns across the country. 5:07 An inquiry carried out by a commission of congressmen uncovered the scheme, and in 1963, a decree from Goulart put an end to that institution. Nonetheless, the North American influence occurred organically as well. 5:23 The slogan, Love It or Leave It, for example, the title of our miniseries, is an example of this. 5:29 Popularized in the US in the 1950s in the context of the hunt for communists, the slogan brings together all the typical ingredients of authoritarian nationalism. 5:40 The manipulation of the idea of love for one's country, the notion of civic obedience, and the exclusion of all government critics, portraying them as internal enemies of the country. 5:53 [radio static] Remind us that peace is not obtained unless you arm peace. There is a vociferous minority in Brazil 6:08 The phrase matched perfectly with the jingoism that military governments fostered to sustain social support for the dictatorship, and began to be used in Brazil in the 1970s when the country was governed by General Emilio Medici. 6:23 There is evidence that the expression was popularized in Brazil by the military, who then commanded the state of São Paulo. 6:31 Well, back to the measures taken by the United States, which did not act only in the political sphere. The country also invested in technical cooperation with the Brazilian Armed Forces and state police forces. 6:44 The bonds were strong. In 1962, Ambassador Lincoln Gordon was already articulating the United States' approach to the Brazilian generals conspiring against Goulart. 6:58 Vernon Walters, who liaised with the Brazilian Expeditionary Force during the Second World War, was chosen as military attaché for the embassy in Rio de Janeiro. 7:09 Walters held meetings with the Brazilian military in Rio on a weekly basis, with General Castelo Branco's approval. 7:18 On March 26th, 1964, five days before the coup, Gordon emphasized to his boss in the United States that once a military insurrection had begun in Brazil, the Americans' ability to demonstrate support and a certain display of force with great speed would be crucial to minimizing the possibility of a prolonged civil war and to guaranteeing a large amount of public support. 7:46 On March 31st, when the coup began in Brazil, which even took some of the commanders and governors involved in the conspiracy by surprise, Lyndon Johnson's government played its part. 7:59 At approximately midday Rio de Janeiro time, a classified order from the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff initiated the largest deployment of combat and support units to date in the South Atlantic. 8:12 The task force was activated to carry out an unprecedented intervention on the Brazilian coast. 8:19 This is how historian Heloisa Starling, in her recently released book, The Coup Machine, describes Operation Brother Sam, put into practice by the Johnson administration to support the military coup plotters in Brazil. 8:35 In this episode, we recount some of the military movements and diplomatic correspondence that the book narrates. On that April 1st, an American Navy squadron left the Norfolk Naval Base in the state of Virginia. 8:49 Leading the charge was the USS Forrestal, the largest heavy attack aircraft carrier in operation at the time, accompanied by two supply ships, a helicopter carrier, an airborne command post, and six destroyers. 9:06 The Air Force also joined in. Bases in New Jersey and Puerto Rico were responsible for transporting equipment, weapons, and ammunition. At the American base in Panama, Commander Robert A. 9:20 Bradweiser took over the coordination of Brother Sam. At least four oil tankers would also be moved. One of the central objectives of the operation was the supply of fuel to the Brazilian coup conspirators. 9:36 But all this logistical assistance ended up not being necessary, as João Goulart could not resist the coup. Heloisa Starling tells us. 9:45 At the end of the afternoon, around 5:30 PM, Gordon was finally able to run to type the crucial message to the State Department. "I believe this is the end, with the democratic rebellion 95% victorious." 9:59 On the night of April 1st, as soon as it got dark, General Castelo Branco called Gordon to confirm that overt military support from the United States would no longer be necessary. 10:11 The deactivation of Operation Brother Sam was gradual. The United States still wanted to ensure that it would be on hand to help if the Brazilian military faced any setbacks. 10:24 At 5:50 PM on the afternoon of April 3rd, the Joint Chiefs of Staff ordered the general commander of the operation, George S. 10:31 Brown, Major General of the Air Force, to carry out a simulated procedure that would preserve the disguise as a training operation, cover up any action, and provide for the fleet's rapid retreat. 10:43 Starling described that not even the commanders involved knew where they were being deployed. They followed a predefined route to Montevideo, with instructions that the actual destination would be revealed later. 10:57 In fact, the operation was kept a secret for many years, but there is evidence that Goulart was informed it was happening, something that factored into his decision not to resist the coup. 11:11 Concurrent with military support, American officials were already planning, in Gordon's words, "numerous economic relief measures that will be necessary to provide rapid aid to the new administration." 11:25 A working group for this was set up on March 31st. 11:31 Once the coup was consolidated, with General Castelo Branco in power, Brazil initially followed a policy of strong alignment with the United States, a position that contradicted the independent foreign policy of Goulart and his predecessor. 11:47 Castelo Branco soon broke diplomatic relations with Cuba, although the dictatorship never cut ties with the Soviet Union. 11:55 In 1965, the military president even sent thousands of Brazilian soldiers to the intervention led by the United States in the Dominican Republic. 12:05 Internally, American influence at the federal level also increased significantly. Legal changes made by the president facilitated the entry of multinational corporations into the country. 12:17 Directives from the Lyndon Johnson administration and American civil society organizations directly affected different areas of public policy in Brazil, including economic institutions, the educational system, and even birth control programs. 12:34 But it's not as if the partnership with the Americans was all that fruitful for Brazil. I talked about the subject with Larissa Correia, who is a history professor of the Pontifical Catholic University in Rio de Janeiro. 12:49 In her PhD thesis at the State University of Campinas, she analyzed in depth the trade union relations between Brazil and the United States during the Brazilian military dictatorship. 13:01 What is interesting to note is that the Alliance for Progress, no matter how much it was advertised, the impacts of the programs were minimal. 13:13 For example, in rural areas in the northeast of the country, between 1965 and 1966 alone, $350,000 were invested in social projects, but the sources don't show us anything close to the amount of funds invested. 13:32 This is a recurring theme. Where did the money go? Even the cooperation in the Dominican Republic did not yield obvious results. 13:41 Approximately 4,000 Brazilian soldiers arrived in the Dominican Republic at the end of 1965, going into 1966. 13:53 We know little about the cost of sending troops, this investment, and what Brazil got in return after this act of military cooperation. 14:05 We can imagine that the return of the United States to Brazil was very small since Costa e Silva, when he took power, soon ordered the withdrawal of Brazilian troops. 14:17 Professor Correia mentions Artur da Costa e Silva, who was the second military president of Brazil's dictatorship. 14:24 After he took office in 1967, Brazilian foreign policy returned to seeking greater autonomy as it did before the coup. 14:34 This is because even the sectors that supported Castelo Branco, including the military, were criticizing Brazil's submissive stance in relation to the United States. 14:44 In their view, they risked the Brazilian left taking control of the nationalist agenda. 14:50 Professor Correia also highlighted that business people who supported the coup demanded the government for greater incentives for national industry, and pointed out that in the Alliance for Progress, Americans linked the implementation of projects to awarding contracts to their own companies. 15:09 The military dictatorship needed to provide economic growth and modernization in order to guarantee sufficient social support and remain in power. To do that, it needed to diversify its partners. 15:22 I believe that this is why Costa e Silva was so detested, so despised by American diplomacy. 15:31 This appears in a certain way in the exaltation of Castelo Branco and in the very negative image they portray of Costa e Silva. 15:42 This is something that appears a lot in North American diplomatic documents and, in a certain way, also in Brazilian historiography. 15:53 The diversification of partnerships in the military presidencies from then on occurred without ideological constraints, including countries in Africa and the Middle East. 16:04 [static hissing] During the government of General Emílio Médici in the early 1970s, Brazil experienced what was dubbed an economic miracle, with high annual growth rates. 16:44 International trade flows intensified. During the government of General Ernesto Geisel from 1974 onwards, political pragmatism gained importance, targeting business. 16:56 For instance, Brazil took the lead on the international stage by recognizing the independence of Angola, which was under a left-wing government at the time. 17:06 It also officially recognized the Communist People's Republic of China. At the United Nations, the country shook hands with Arab states. 17:15 The expansion of Brazilian diplomatic activity, however, was better seen in the field of bilateral relations. Brazil distanced itself from multilateral forums. 17:27 It had lost footing after playing the national sovereignty card to justify complaints that the Brazilian state engaged in systematic violations of human rights, with censorship, torture, prisons, forced disappearances, and murder of opponents. 17:44 [static hissing] Professor Correia highlighted that the American government's concern with the direction of authoritarianism in Brazil began back in Castelo Branco's government, especially when it became clear that there wouldn't be a new direct presidential election American congressmen started denouncing the CIA's participation in all this. 18:21 Because of this and a series of other geopolitical calculations, tensions with the United States increased. 18:28 A significant episode occurred in 1975 when Brazil exchanged its nuclear partnership with the United States for an agreement with West Germany. 18:39 Criticized for internal violence, Brazil also broke its military cooperation agreement with the United States. However, Brazil continued to be an important international actor given the economic prosperity in the period. 18:53 At least abroad, as at home, Brazilians were seeing their wages stagnate. These accusations created discomfort in diplomatic relations, but did not harm economic transactions. 19:07 Multinationals continued to operate in the country without major constraints. In Latin America, closer neighbors gained importance in Brazil's foreign policy. That's what we will focus on in the next episode. 19:22 This podcast series was written by me, Isabela Cruz, and produced by Andre Chavasse. The script was edited by Ewan Marshall. Fabiane Ziola Menezes narrated some excerpts. 19:35 We'd also like to thank Professor Larissa Correia for her participation. 19:40 A note, in the first episode, I mentioned that US troops could invade Brazil, but it's necessary to clarify that the first American ships sent were specifically intended for support with weapons and fuel, as this episode explained. 19:56 As always, we ask you to give us a five-star rating wherever you get your podcasts. It takes only a second, and it will help us reach a broader audience. 20:06 Or better yet, sign up for The Brazilian Report, the journalistic engine behind this podcast. Many thanks for listening. See you soon in episode three. 20:20 [outro music]