Transcript 0:00 [upbeat music] Hello, and welcome to Explaining Brazil, the podcast by The Brazilian Report in partnership with the Brazil Office Alliance. My name is Gustavo Ribeiro. 0:17 I'm the editor-in-chief of The Brazilian Report. Brazil's 2026 electoral campaign is officially underway. Since August the 16th, candidates have been allowed to explicitly ask for votes and hand out campaign material. 0:34 And on August 28th, the free airtime blocks kick in. Those unmistakable party ads w- will flood radio and TV every day until October the 1st, three days before the first round. 0:47 Almost all the attention goes to the presidential race. Congressional races get whatever is left over, which isn't much, and there are reasons for that. 0:57 Presidential campaigns are a clash of big personalities with nationwide reach, and we get a steady drip of horse race polling, and there will be televised debates. Congressional races have none of those, those things. 1:11 The format is complicated, there are thousands of candidates, and the polling is close to useless. 1:17 Not because pollsters are bad or ill-intentioned, but because voters simply don't pay enough attention to down-ballot races. And I have an anecdote that makes the point, but it needs a setup first. 1:30 In Brazil, we vote on electronic voting machines, and every candidate is assigned a number you punch into a keypad. Presidential and gubernatorial candidates get two digits. 1:43 So for instance, Lula is number 13, Flávio Bolsonaro is number 22. Candidates for the lower house get four digits each, and the first two are their party's number. 1:56 So Workers' Party candidates all start with 13, Liberal Party candidates with 22. So within that, the candidate a party believes can pull the most votes get the numbers that are the easiest to remember. 2:10 So in the case of the Workers' Party, for instance, that's 1313, 1300. 2:17 Uh, the center left PDT, for instance, carries the number 12, and it hands out, it hands out 1234, 1200, 1212 to its best candidates. Now the anecdote. 2:33 The last time I went to vote in 2022, the person that was ahead of me froze once they were inside the booth, and they had forgotten the candidate's number. 2:43 And here's the thing, you're allowed to walk in with a piece of paper listing every number you plan to punch in. 2:50 So that person hadn't even bothered to do that and essentially lost their vote, because once you go into the booth, you can't, you cannot consult anything outside of it. 3:02 So that's how casually Brazilians treat the races for Congress, and they shouldn't. 3:08 Because the presidential race, of course, it matters enormously, but power in Brazil is increasingly won and lost in Congress just as much, and that's where the budget is increasingly being controlled and where any president agenda lives or dies. 3:27 So to discuss where the Brazilian Congress stands today, uh, we have invited Beatriz Rey. She is a political scientist and a researcher at the University of Lisbon. Beatriz is an old friend of this show. 3:42 She wrote a column for The Brazilian Report for years, and she recently coordinated a policy paper with Sérgio Fausto for the Fernando Henrique Cardoso Foundation on how to improve the way Congress operates. 3:55 Bea, hello, and, uh, welcome back to the show. Thanks for joining us. Thank you for the invitation. It's good to be back. And of course, as always, I am joined by my regular podcasting partner, Dr. 4:09 James Green, a historian at Brown University and chairman of the board of directors at the Brazil Office Alliance. James, thanks for being here with us as well. It's great to be here, Gustavo. Hel- hello, Bea. Prazer. 4:22 Prazer. So Bea, uh, Brazilian Congress has never been this powerful, uh, especially in this post-dictatorship era. In the early years of that re-democratization, most laws came from the executive branch. 4:39 But now Congress is asserting itself more, and it now controls also a massive chunk of the federal budget, what we call, uh, the emendas parlamentares, or the budgetary grants. 4:54 And they have more power over the purse than arguably any other Western legislature. So how did that happen? Because Congress asserting itself is not bad per se, but what is happening in Brazil? 5:08 What are the good things about it, and what are the bad things about it? So the short version is, uh, this process did not happen overnight, and it did not happen through one big reform. 5:21 It's the accumulation of about two decades of smaller shifts, plus, I think, a couple of turning points. For most of the post-dictator period, the president really did run the show in Brazil. 5:35 So, uh, if we look at earlier works, uh, uh, done in political science between 1988 and the early 2000s, about 85% of the laws that got approved originated in the presidency, and the odds of Congress actually, uh, killing a presidential bill were under 3%. 5:54 I think the f- to me, and that's what, uh, we, we write in the, the policy papers, that the first, uh, turning point was in 2001, when Congress reformed how provisional decrees work. 6:07 Provisional decrees are like, uh, executive orders in the US. Um, they work a little bit different, but I think that's the, the most appropriate comparison I can think about right now. 6:17 Uh, so what Congress did, did is they capped their validity, required a joint committee to review them, uh, ended the practice of the president just reissuing the same decree over and over again. 6:28 Uh, that reform forced a negoti- forced negotiation in a way that, uh, hadn't existed before. 6:36 And then in 2009, uh, researchers in political science, they document that was the first year, uh, that deputies and senators passed more bill of their own, uh, sponsorship than the president. Um, from there, I think... 6:54 I think it's cumulative. Congress starts building up, um, technical capacity. Uh, legislative consultancies, uh, hire more qualified people. 7:05 Committees, uh, at that point at least, uh, start working as, uh, policy shops, uh, approving, uh, legislation. 7:14 And then, uh, we have been discussing this a lot in Brazil recently, in 2015 and '19, two rounds of budget reforms, uh, made a chunk of the federal budget, uh, constitutionally guaranteed to individual and party amendments. 7:31 Uh, that was the money that the president used to, uh, be able to, uh, to negotiate and, uh, reward allies and punish non-allies. Uh, that money now is just owned. 7:45 That's the budgetary, uh, amendments or grants that you were referring to. Uh, we don't know the extent to which that shifted leverage. I, I am involved in a research project myself trying to figure that out. 7:57 Uh, part of the literature says that it has, part of the literature says that it hasn't, so we're trying to understand that. Uh, I think COVID, the COVID pandemic, made all of this process, uh, more visible 8:11 when, uh, in 2020, Congress wrote most all of the pandemic-related re- legislation, uh, 96% of the bills on the topic. 8:21 Uh, it also, a lot of the, I don't have the numbers right now, but a lot of, most of the approved, uh, legislation was, uh, sponsored by legislators. 8:30 And then when the government, that was the Bolsonaro administration, when it proposed a 200, uh, reais emergency payment to citizens, the, it was the Chamber of Deputies who said, "No. Uh, we want 500 reais." 8:45 Um, and then that, that amount turned out to be 600 reais. So there you really saw Congress acting, uh, proactively in the policy-making process. Now, is it good or bad? 8:58 Uh, on the contrary to what [laughs] the piece in The Economist says, uh, sort of putting that in my voice, uh, which I did not say, uh, I do not think that a more assertive Congress is an, is a problem. 9:12 I don't think it is necessarily. Uh, I think Congress has the potential to act as a co-policymaker with the executive, um, if a certain, certain conditions are, are met, right? Uh, the president is one person. 9:29 It reflects one political group. Congress, uh, has hundreds of people from every region and every ideology. Um, so I think it- And like 20 parties as well. [laughs] What? And 20 parties as well, so- Oh, yeah. 9:45 [laughs] I mean, it's k- it's, it, we're, we're reducing the number after the institutional reforms. Uh, I think we're, we're, we're getting there. Um, but I think that's something that we have to keep in mind, right? 9:55 So when Congress works well, I think that's a feature, not a bug. Uh, it should make policy more legitimate, more likely to stick. Um, the argument that we have in the policy paper is not that Congress got too strong. 10:09 It's that a lot of this strength got built through the backdoor, uh, informal deals, procedural shortcuts, rather than through Congress's own formal groups. 10:20 I think that's the part that worries me, worries Se- Senator Fausto, and, uh, not the gained power or the more assertive power itself. 10:31 So, um, Bia, y- you know, your paper talks about the leadership councils that are formed by, um, members of Congress to set the agenda in the lower house, in the Câmara de Deputados, or the Chamber of the Deputies or House of Representatives. 10:44 And now they meet over lunch at a restaurant or at some lawmaker's living room. So what is a legislative, a legislature look like when its most important coordinating body has no address? 10:54 It's in this informality, the way it's set up. That is a great question. Um, and this is one of the, the things that, uh, when I found out, um, I, I, it, I was just shocked. 11:06 So the, the leaders council on paper is a formal body. Uh, it has leaders of every party and bloc. Um, and uh, the job that the, the institution has is to help the president of the chamber to decide on the floor agenda. 11:23 Uh, the way that... So the, the thing is, the way that it appears in the formal internal rules, it's, it is still between formal, uh, formality and informality. 11:35 So I think because of that, uh, presidents have basically ran the, the council as they wished. Um, in the f- the first years after the approval of these internal rules, um, 11:49 the, the, the, the council did work as, uh, a consulted body that met regularly, but ever since, um, the, the president of the chamber just decides exactly how it's going to, to, to, to run the show. 12:03 Uh, and so in recent years, uh, specifically during the, the administration of Arthur Lira, uh, who was the... So I'm saying president, but it's, it's, it's the, uh, equivalent of the House Speaker in the US. 12:17 Uh, Artur Lira was the equivalent of House Speaker, and, um, we started talking, researchers were- started talking to civil society groups and journalists, and we learned that these meetings were happening in s- dinners, in restaurants, or members' living rooms, or sometimes even the House Speaker's, uh, own house, [laughs] 12:38 uh, not inside the chamber per se. 12:41 So what you have is a body that is supposed to be the main forum where Congress negotiates its own agenda, or at the very least, the, the Chamber of Deputies, um, and it's not even happening inside the institution. 12:55 Uh, when the new House Speaker, um, um, Gomerta took over, uh, the f- one of the first things that he did was he made this, the meetings public. 13:07 What we're asking in the paper is not only that the meetings are public, uh, we're asking for, uh, public records, uh, documents that we can use to actually know what's happening in these meetings, right? Uh, because if, 13:21 if I want to know, uh, why the floor calendar looks the way that it does, I don't even have a way to locate what was discussed in each meeting. 13:32 Um, I have to basically find a way to be there, or I don't, I don't know if they're transmitting that. I'm assuming no. Um, so when you have the, the Leaders' Council working in the shadows like that, it, it's... 13:47 What it's going to produce, it's the kind of Congress that works somewhat in the shadow, right? And a Congress that is more assertive, but, uh, in which the real bargaining is happening 14:03 outside the, the, the li- the lines, right? Outside the formal lines. Um, so our recommendation is, uh, is really, uh, I think it's almost embarrassingly basic, right? 14:15 Uh, the meetings should happen inside the institution. Um, the, the body should vote. There should be a, a, a majority decision on the agenda. The agenda should be public. 14:27 Uh, the same way, by the way, that the, the, uh, the committee's agendas are public. 14:31 If I want to know what is being discussed in each committee, um, regular, the standing committees or the special committees, I can, I have that information on their website. 14:40 The same thing should be true about the Leaders' Council. And, uh, you mentioned the pandemic. Uh, now let's talk a little bit because the pandemic introduced remote sittings and remote votes, and, uh, this 14:58 have been used with gusto ever since. Uh, they are, they're still a feature of the House at this moment, uh, even though we're no longer under COVID restrictions. 15:10 How does that fundamentally alter the legislative process? 15:18 So the pandemic, the tool that, uh, we developed for Congress to work during the pandemic, which by the way, Brazil was a pi- one of the pioneer legislatures in the world. This was a good thing back in the pandemic. 15:32 That was supposed to be temporary, but it never really went away. 15:36 Um, Brazil was one of the first to build a remote deliberation system so that Congress could still make decisions and importantly, decisions about the pandemic, uh, when no legislator could be inside the building because of health measures. 15:54 Um, now what's happening is that the Chamber and the Senate, they run hybrid sessions every Monday and Friday with the little changes in between how it happens in, uh, the Chamber and the Senate. 16:07 Uh, which by the way, are the two days that legislators are usually not in Brasilia. They are in their legislative districts, um, doing work. I'm not saying that they're not working. 16:17 They are working, but doing different legislative work. Um, so I think that the problem, first of all, I think there are two problems here. 16:28 The first one is that you're basically killing politics by allowing hybrid sessions to still happen. It's one thing to have that system operating when, um, when you have a health emergency, a pandemic, right? 16:45 It's another thing when you really don't have a reason to, to, to have that system in place. 16:52 If, uh, legislators are not in Brasilia in these two days, then all the voting should happen in the other days as it, as it always did. 17:00 Um, when you take legislators out of the floor and allow them to vote remotely, uh, you, first of all, you don't know who is voting necessarily, and if the person knows what they're voting on. 17:14 Uh, all of the bargaining that should happen on the floor doesn't, it doesn't exist, so that's why I, what I mean by killing politics, you're taking politics out of the process. Uh, and then, uh, the fourth thing is that 17:30 this, this tool has been used tactically. So there are, there is the case, for instance, that we describe in the paper where the Speaker, um, delayed reinstating in-person committees specifically. 17:43 So a constitutional amendment, um, on parliamentary immunity could clear its first procedural hurdle on the fi- virtual floor, skipping the committee that's actually supposed to vet it. 17:57 Uh, you also have cases of, um, the Speaker manipulating the number of legislators who need to be present on the floor, uh, in terms of allowing the ones who are outside, uh, traveling in Europe, for instance, to, to have their votes count so that the measure or the bill that he supports is approved or not approved. 18:20 Um, that is the problem, right? We're not following the rules here, and we're using a tool that was supposed to last for a specific period of time to operate in daily- daily routine. Uh, that's not okay. 18:33 So we propose, uh, s- several restrictions. Basically, uh, if I had to summarize it, it's basically 18:42 this, uh, uh, this system that was developed for the pandemic, uh, the remote system, should only be used in extraordinary conditions such as a pandemic, a climate crisis, something that is extraordinary. 18:57 That's why it was created. It was never created to be a part of the- the, the routine of Congress. Gustavo, do you wanna take the next question? Sure. Uh, let's talk about, a little bit about the fact that, um, 19:15 you, you also mentioned provisional decrees. And, uh, so these, uh, long story short, uh, they have to be approved by Congress until up to 180 days, otherwise they expire. Mm. And, uh, what we ha- have been seeing 19:34 is many of them ex- simply expiring, not being turned down by lawmakers, but just, uh, uh, losing their validity, uh, by inertia. 19:47 Uh, in 2020, you mentioned that 56 of them, uh, fell to that fate. Is that a problem? Is that just Congress exercising its discretion? Because, I mean, not ruling on the provisional decree is also 20:06 a way of, of deciding. H- how do you see this? 20:11 Uh, I don't think it's just discretion, uh, because I think discretion would imply that someone inside Congress made a decision, and I think the problem here is that nobody's making any decision, right? 20:25 No decision is being made. Um, so a provisional decree, just to clarify, it takes effect immediately once it's issued by the executive, which means rules change, money moves. 20:38 [laughs] Uh, once the president signs it, then it's valid. Uh, then it has 120 days to get an actual vote inside Congress. 20:46 It has an entire process of, uh, of a committee that is supposed to be composed of legislators from the Senate and from the Chamber. Um, that was also the subject of a lot of debate, uh, for many years, but, um, 21:01 that is how the process is supposed to work. Congress has 120 days to collectively decide, and collectively, I mean both the Chamber and the Senate. Uh, when nothing happens, 21:13 it expires, and then all of that that happened, the rules, the, the money, it, it just, it's not valid anymore. 21:19 So, um, I think in tw- 20, uh, 2001, when I described that first change that we had, um, in terms of Congress being more assertive, what I hear from lawmakers is that that... 21:33 Lawmakers were there by the time, uh, at the time, by the way. Um, they enacted that reform because they were very, very, very tired of just the president reissuing, uh, o- um, uh, sorry. 21:47 I'm, I'm thinking about executive decrees. Provisional decrees over and over again. They, they got very tired. 21:52 They, they felt they were being abused, uh, in, in, in a way, and so they wanted to put a cap on exactly what the president could do, and I think that's the legitimate, um, that's a leg- a legitimate interest, right? 22:06 Um, Congress wanted to be part of the policymaking process. 22:10 But now we're going to the other extreme in which the president tries to exert its, uh, prerogative of issuing a provisional decree, and then Congress just does nothing. It, it doesn't, uh, it doesn't work. 22:24 It doesn't take action. Uh, and I think that matters because I think... and that's where it gets the part that people should be worried, um, that rules have changed and money has gone through the door. So, um, 22:39 you can spend, like, you have some of these decrees that you have, uh, dealing with budget credits, right? Uh, so what happens when Congress just sits on a decree and, and makes no decision? 22:51 Uh, that, that's not discretion. 22:54 I think that's, to me, that's a hole in the system, and I think it's gotten worse a lot because of this fight between the House and the Senate in terms of who should preside the joint committee to analyze them. 23:06 But now I think it's just also a function of Congress just not wanting to do its job. 23:13 So there's another issue, which is the power of the Brazilian speaker of the house, which, which is called Presidente in, in Brazil, but it's equivalent, where they can pull a bill out of a committee, or they can attach one proposal to another, or they can call a surprise session without almost no notice. 23:29 So if, if you were listening to this in the United States, you would hear echoes of, uh, the Speakers of the House and their power. 23:36 Our British listeners might think of the government's control over the Commons timetable. But how much power does the Brazilian speaker actually have compared to these counterparts, and, and where does it come from? Uh, 23:51 that is a very good question. Um, I think it has... I, I don't, I don't know 23:57 the case of these legislatures well enough to say that it has more or less power, but I do know the case of Brazil's legislature very well, and I think, uh, it has a lot of unchecked power. That's what I think. 24:12 Um, there is a lot happening with the decisions of the speaker that needed to be checked, and that, that process is not happening. Um- 24:22 So there is, uh, we describe something in the policy paper, uh, I'm gonna try to translate. I think it's, I would translate it as a committee pull power, uh, if that makes sense. 24:33 That was a resolution that was passed in 1994. Um, and it lets the speaker yank a bill out of committee, uh, any committee, once a deadline's missed, and send it wherever he wants. 24:48 In- which includes straight to the floor for a vote. Um, I think on its own that's probably not crazy, right? 24:58 Because there is, there could be a case where the legislature reaches a gridlock, uh, and then somebody needs to have the power to break the gridlock. 25:07 Uh, but the problem is that, again, with [laughs] again, like with the, the remote system, that that power has built itself into the daily practice of Congress. So now it's routine. 25:21 Um, and I think it's, it ends up hollowing out the policy work that used to happen in committees, right? And that power itself created in Brazil a figure that I think it's very curious. 25:33 Uh, [laughs] in Brazil, we have rapporteurs inside committees who is the legislator who is supposed to read the bill, study the bill, uh, hold public hearings, listening to their peers inside the committee, and produce a report, uh, suggesting that the committee either accepts or rejects the bill. 25:52 Uh, once the speaker yanks the bill out of comm- a committee like that with that, uh, that pull, pull power, what you have on the floor is the figure of the floor rapporteur [laughs] 26:05 reporting on behalf of a committee on the floor. Which is something that when I realized that in Congress, I was just like, "Okay, this makes no sense." Like, "This should be happening inside the committees." 26:15 Um, so you can see how that distorts the legislative process, right? 26:20 Um, the other thing is, um, Brazil, uh, the, the House specifically right now, uh, and I'm sorry that I'm using House and Chamber interchangeably, um, but it's the same institution. 26:32 Um, it operates mainly through extraordinary sessions, which are sessions that, um, give more leeway for the speaker and the steering committee to just, um, jump processes, so to say. 26:49 Uh, the, the routine, the former routine, would be to have most sessions as ordinary, right? Ordinary sessions, which is like when the- ordinary business, right? Ordinary routine. 27:02 Uh, what we show in the paper is that by the mid-2010s, you had roughly four times as many extraordinary sessions as ordinary ones in one given year. 27:13 And then ordinary sessions have basically disappeared from the official record since 2020. That lets the speaker pick the agenda, pick the timing, uh, engineer the quorum. Uh, it's, it's a one person show, right? 27:29 The other thing- Uh, Beatriz, if I may, uh, interrupt you, and I'm sorry for that. But, uh, 27:35 we, we, uh, you mentioned a few times that, uh, the legislative process in the House has become, uh, entirely attached to the speaker. 27:47 And we have seen e- over the past few years, uh, very two different, uh, two very different types of speaker. 27:55 A, an extremely strong one, like Eduardo Cunha or Arthur Lira, uh, people who not only, uh, know the, the bylaws of the House inside and out so they can exploit it the way they want, but also who command the floor and, uh, are able to whip votes. 28:17 And then you have, uh, speakers like Hugo Motta, the current one, a very young legislator, and who is considered by most, uh, akin, uh, House observers, a, a weak speaker of the House. He, uh, his deals do not stand. 28:35 Uh, he responds to who yells the loudest at him. Uh, what is worse? Hmm. Uh, someone with an iron grip, uh, on the legislator, or someone who just, uh, 28:51 lets the, the mad people run the, the mental institution? So I would say that it doesn't really matter who is better or who's worse. The, the issue to me is we shouldn't have the House, uh, 29:09 the legislative process inside the House happening in terms of the personality of the speaker. 29:16 The rules should be enforced in a way that it doesn't matter if Arthur Lira is the one who likes to, um, the [laughs] we use the, the word in Portuguese, uh, atropelo, right? 29:28 That, that just disregards all rules and just- Just bulldozing everything... bulldozing, thank you. Bulldozing everything. Or if the speaker is, uh, somebody who's young and nice and likes to chat. 29:39 So I heard, like, I was at the speaker election in Brasilia, the last one. I heard this from legislators from the left to the right. Like, "We are tired of bulldozing. We, we, we, we really want things to happen 29:53 in the way that they should." [laughs] Like, there are rules for that. 29:57 It's because the rules are either, uh, have been hollowed out to a point that now we need new ones or changes in the existing ones, or that they're just not being respected at all. 30:08 Like, that, that, that is why you're asking me that question, Gustavo, because the rules don't matter and what matters is the personality, because the rules are not being respected. 30:18 So you see the, the, the problem comes exactly in that, I think James, you wanna go? Uh, sure. We can talk about betting, if that's another thing. There's- Mm... the gambling bill is a small story that tells a big one. 30:32 A working group met three months ago, held one public hearing, left almost no records, wrote an entirely new bill, and sent it to the floor without a single standing committee touching it. 30:43 And how common is this, that route, uh, right now? Unfortunately, more common than people realize, and I think it's becoming sort of a default route for anything that is considered politically awkward. 30:57 Um, I think that the pattern that you're describing with the gambling bill is almost like a template, uh, from... 31:03 And I- I've done work for the Brazilian report about this topic, so Gustavo knows [laughs] very well, uh, where I'm coming from. 31:09 Um, so you have a working group that gets set up outside the formal, the normal committee system, committee system, meets for a few months, uh, holds, I don't know, a number of public hearings or no public hearings, uh, doesn't live leave 31:25 any paper trail, or not much of a paper trail, writes its own bill from scratch, and that, that goes on the floor. Um, that's, uh, yeah, that, it's, it's completely absurd to me. 31:36 Um, and it's not, like, something that happened once or twice, right? Um, the, between the early 2000s and today, the number of these working groups, uh, the speaker's office, uh, has created went from 3 to, like, 22. 31:51 Uh, it's not really incremental. 31:54 It, it's, what I see here is that Congress is really building a parallel track for, for bills, and, and it may be the case that the committee system is, uh, not able to, to deal with the amount of bills that we have in Brazil. 32:07 And I know it's, th- they are a lot, believe me. I, [laughs] I work in legislative data. They are a lot. 32:12 But if that's the case, then we think to, we need to sit down and rethink how committees work, not create an unform, informal parallel track to analyze bills. Um, and why does that matter, right? 32:24 Uh, standing committees have obligations. They are required to hold public hearings. They importantly, and most importantly, they have to reflect the party balance of the whole chamber, the whole House. 32:37 Um, that is a very key difference between the committees and the, the working groups. Working groups, th- they basically, they can operate as, as they want. 32:47 Uh, you can have as many, uh, members from the opposition or the, the government that the speaker wants. 32:55 Uh, the speaker decides who is on the c- the working group, how long the working group's gonna run, uh, whether it has to leave a paper trail or, or not, or even the, the members of the working group can convince the speaker, and then that's it. 33:08 Uh, there's no accountability. Uh, so when you have a bill going through a working group instead of a committee, it's not just about skipping a formality. 33:18 I think you're skipping the actual mechanism that's supposed to give the public, citizens, uh, a say before something comes, becomes law. 33:33 Now, Bia, you and Sergio Fausto from the Fernando Henrique Cardoso Foundation have proposals that are less a call for reform and more tweaks to the legislative process. 33:50 Uh, there is no constitutional overhaul. It's more touching on the rule book of the, of the House. Uh, but then again, you're asking a group of politicians to voluntarily give up discretion they enjoy. 34:06 Why would they do that? Because right now they control the legislative process. They are, uh, 34:15 increasingly more powerful over the budget, and, uh, that has reduced the cost of being in the opposition to any given government. Uh, I mean, how can you put the genie back in the bottle? 34:27 Uh, and is there any precedent in Brazilian politics for Congress restraining itself? 34:34 I think that's a fair question, and that's usually the last question [laughs] I get from every journalist I've talked to about this paper is, e- exactly why would they even bother to do that, th- that we have clear signals that they're not interested. 34:48 Um, I think first, uh, is what you said. We're not asking for changes that would, um, s- just completely create an entire new Congress. That's not what we're saying. 35:01 Everything that we're proposing can be enacted through a resolution bill that only needs to be approved inside the chambers if the H- House are dissenting, 35:12 um, that are basically improvements in terms of how the rules are, either because they're not being respected or because a parallel track has been created anyway. 35:20 Regardless of the why, we're just, uh, creating their, uh, a- adding layers, uh, to the, to the rule book, uh, through these... 35:30 And, and the way to do this is through the resolutions, which again, i- it's, it's an internal affairs o- of Congress. It, it doesn't require anything but the, the, the support of themselves, right? 35:42 Uh, and in that way, our expe- e- our expectation with the policy paper is that we would hope that 35:53 a lot of legislators get interested in the paper, and we are discussing on, like, in terms of how we can make that happen. Um, 36:04 so that each one would get an idea and propose as a, a resolution bill so that it's not one big effort. It's, like, small efforts happening in different timelines, um, so that it's more palatable for Congress. 36:21 The other thing is, as I said, uh, I've, I've talked to legislators, and I know that they are all dissatisfied with the status quo, um, from the left to the right. 36:31 Um- I spent a lot of time talking to them during the election for speaker and spe- specifically inside the House, and they are all dissatisfied because it makes their life harder, right? 36:43 It- it's very hard if you're a legislator and if, if you care about your job, and y- you get the, the agenda for the floor session like two hours before you're supposed to be there and vote. Like, how... 36:57 You can't do your job well. So I think there is a consensus inside, um, that things are not, uh, working as they should, even if that consensus has, um, 37:10 weakened a little because of the profile, the personality of Ugumata, who is not bulldozing everything, uh, all the time. I think that there is still that will inside Congress. Um, and there is precedent, right? 37:24 Uh, and it's not even ancient history, uh, Brazilian politics. 37:28 Uh, in 2005, Congress changed its own rules in, in terms of how committee and leadership seats get allocated, uh, to top members from switching parties midterm just to gain the sit- the seat count. 37:44 That was an instance of self-regulation. 37:47 Uh, and it was done because the instability has- had gotten so bad that even the people that were benefiting from the old system wanted a fix, and I think we are in a similar moment right now, um, except a little broader, right? 38:01 It's not gonna be a narrow fix, as I said, and that's why we hope that it's several people working in, in different, uh, resolution bills at, uh, in different times. Um, but it- and, and it's a fix. Um, 38:16 and I think that the alternative of, of not doing anything has a cost. Uh, we have a Congress that if it keeps operating through improvisation, undocumented deals, bulldozing decisions [laughs], uh- Mm... 38:32 that does, it... Yes, it does look, it makes Congress looks bad, but, um, it makes Congress itself harder to negotiate with, harder to trust by citizens, by, right, by parties. Um, 38:47 and I think that is probably going to feed into the erosion of confidence in the whole political system. 38:56 So I think at the, at some point, I would hope that self-interest and institutional health, um, sh- they should point in the same direction. 39:07 So Bia, if you're right, the next president, whether it's, um, in, in October, whoever wins in October, whether it's Lula or Fla- Flávio or another person, Congress is gonna be stronger and less predictable and harder to negotiate with than in any other democratic era. 39:22 So how can one govern, uh, under such circumstances? Uh, I think a lot of it will depend on how the composition of the Senate look, what, what it looks like. Um, we don't know how conservative it will become. 39:39 Uh, I keep hearing that it should be more conservative than it actually is, and then the government 39:45 in the hypothetical, um, second administration of Lula, second in this round, um, that the government would lose, um, any leeway that it had in terms of the Senate. Uh- Did he have leeway? 40:00 [laughs] I mean, a little bit, right? I mean, we should, we could move to a situation in which there is no r- not even, like, room to talk, which I think it would be much worse, right? Um, just because of 40:13 the shift to, like the extreme shift to the right. Uh, I keep hearing things that would, that say that this will happen and this won't happen, so I'm, I'm, I'm not gonna take a position on that. Uh, I don't think... 40:25 A- after the 2018 election, I decided I, I don't make predictions anymore as a political [laughs] scientist. So I wait for results of the election and then reanalyze. Um, so I think, uh, 40:38 regardless of who wins, we have a more assertive, assertive Congress, um, for sure. We saw that with Bolsonaro. 40:47 Um, even when he decided that he was interested in governing, and that was halfway through his, uh, administration, he f- he had difficulties with Congress, uh, more than once. Um, so I think, uh, 41:03 to govern in that environment, there are two layers there, I think. 41:09 One is, and, and Gustavo and I have talked about this, that I think the Lula's present administration made many mistakes throughout the, the last four years in terms of how to negotiate, how to, the timing of negotiation, how many fronts of negotiation were there in Congress. 41:26 So I think perhaps finding a more, um, skillful strategy, uh, would be s- something that any government should pursue. Um, but it, the fix also has to be institutional. 41:40 Um, so if the rules themselves are unpredictable and largely informal, uh, any president is gonna be negotiating with a moving target, right? [laughs] So I think that the proposals we have in this paper, um, 41:58 are actually the precondition for any president, uh, being able to make a deal that sticks. Um, and I think presidents perhaps should also, um, join this, uh, this effort, right? 42:14 To, to ask Congress to self-regulate so then, um, maybe we can have a little more peace in executive legislative re- relations [laughs] in the near future. Bia, thank you very much. 42:30 This, uh, was great, uh, and, um, we hope that, uh, your suggestions will be carried out by lawmakers even though, uh, I'm not usually known for my optimism. 42:43 [laughs] But, [laughs] uh, but, uh, I would like also to take this opportunity and put you on the spot and say that James and I will have a live broadcast on election day, and you would be more than welcome especially to comment on the outlook of the next Congress that will, uh, take office in February 2027. 43:05 And then, uh, we should also have you, uh, at that moment to talk about how the next government will be able to negotiate or not with the next Congress. 43:18 Bia Haie, uh, researcher at the University of Lisbon, thank you very much for joining us. Thank you. Thank you, Bia. And I'm, I'm in for the commentary on the election. Great. [laughs] Wonderful. 43:29 We'll be looking forward to seeing you there. Thank you both. James, thank you again. Uh, uh, see you next week. Até. Até. Obrigada, gente. 43:41 Thank you s- th- thanks for listening, everyone, and next week Explaining Brazil will be back. Have a good one, folks.