Transcript 0:00 [gentle music] Before we start this week's show, I'd like to remind you that The Brazilian Report is funded by subscriptions and support from loyal readers. 0:10 Besides subscribing to our website and getting exclusive daily content on Brazil and Latin America, you can also treat our staff to one to five cups of coffee a month. 0:20 In return, you get exclusive benefits, like special newsletters, behind-the-scenes content, as well as a shout-out here on our podcast. 0:30 And today, I would like to thank our Buy Me a Coffee members, John Thomas III, Luis Hans, Erwin Menezes, Orlando Black, Steve Knapp, Aaron Burger, James Coney, Kars Vrijzwijk, Alasdair Townsend, Peter Abrahamsen, Michael Fryer, Miller Renascido, Jim Awofadẹju, David Dixon, Felipe Saito, Jose Jose Stankovich, Gabriela Graff Innes, Emerging Market Muser, Yarden Ifhtar, Tonika Thompson, Anderson da Silva, Cat Kramer, Fra, Peter Suffering, Anna Lund, and someone who chose to remain anonymous. 1:12 If you also believe in the importance of independent journalism and if you want to hear your name on our podcast, head over to buymeacoffee.com/brazilianreport and subscribe to one of the membership tiers. 1:26 If you cannot make a monthly commitment, you can still tip us a cup of coffee every now and then to give us the energy boost we need to cover a country as complex as Brazil and a region as complex as Latin America. 1:40 We appreciate any support you can give us. Click on buymeacoffee.com/brazilianreport to find out more. 1:48 [gentle music] [tense music] In the four years of Jair Bolsonaro's presidency, Brazil's relationship with China, the country's biggest trading partner, was lukewarm at best. 2:19 [upbeat music] Now, Bolsonaro's successor, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, has promised to, quote, "Bring Brazil back to the world," and that also means getting closer to Beijing, of course. 2:36 As a matter of fact, the Lula government announced that his first international trips would be to Argentina, Uruguay, the US, Portugal, and China. 2:48 On this week's episode, we will discuss what else we can expect from Brazil-China relations under the Lula government. My name is Gustavo Ribeiro. I'm the editor-in-chief of The Brazilian Report. 3:01 This is Explaining Brazil. 3:04 [upbeat music] To discuss Brazil-China relations, this week we're delighted to welcome Aline Tedeschi. 3:20 She holds a PhD in international relations and is a professor at the Hunan Normal University. 3:27 She's also a media manager at Platform Shumian, the director of think tank Observa China, and a host member professor at BRICS The Catalyst. Hi, Aline. Thanks for joining us. 3:41 I'm thrilled to be here and to be able to contribute with The Brazilian Report. And we're thrilled to have you. 3:48 But before we talk about what's to come in regard to China, I'd like to ask you to look in the rear-view mirror for a second. How was Brazil's relationship with China during the Bolsonaro years? Was it all that bad? 4:04 I believe that we can divide this spectrum into rhetoric and what it actually was in terms of trade and in terms of, um, dialogue, I, I mean, uh, economic dialogue. 4:17 Uh, I would say that because of political frictions and the rhetoric of govern- Bolsonaro's government of posing even one image of the enemy, which is, let's say, a copy from United States' vision at that moment, from the Trumpism vision toward China, I believe that the political spectrum, it was damaged, but not to the point to reach economic and trade balance, for example. 4:48 So it was not that bad, I would say. I w- I would sum up on, uh, some takeaways. For example, trade increased. 4:59 Um, I would say that especially Ministry of Agriculture in Brazil took a lead on this relationship with China. 5:07 Um, but I, I, I believe the rhetoric on this sense didn't impact substantially on levels that they could not trade or they could not, uh, even improve some channels of dialogue, even the quality of some investments coming from China, for example, uh, in areas such as technology. 5:31 Um, but of course, it, it was an impediment to increase the dialogue in many other areas, for example, the multilateral or climate crisis or sustainability, um, multilateral 5:46 organizations, let's say, and many political or global political issues. It was not that bad, but could be better. Right. 5:55 And, I mean, backers of Bolsonaro tend to downplay his antagonistic stance toward Beijing, but we actually saw him suggesting on more than one occasion that China created and spread the coronavirus as a move of biological warfare. 6:11 [upbeat music]Like you said, that does not mean that trade was hampered because a report by the China-Brazil Business Council shows that over 13% of Chinese capital invested in the world in 2021 came here to Brazil, 6:33 more than anywhere else, and 48% of Chinese investments made in South America between 2005 and 2021 came here. 6:44 I believe as many other issues relating to China, it's difficult to, uh, focus on this or that. 6:53 So when you go to China and experience the culture and the dynamics, social dynamics even, and trade dynamics, you see that it is something more like this and that. 7:06 And so I, I believe that there is one impact, of course, as I said, uh, earlier, there was room for improving this relationship in terms of qualitative, um, elements and, and it was not done. Um, 7:21 China actually lost in terms of, uh, representation, percentage of representation in Brazil's, uh, exports in, in relation to other countries, but it doesn't mean that the trade is shrinked. Actually, it didn't. 7:38 But I do believe that China is this pragmatic that we are posing and so it doesn't, it doesn't generate, um, 7:47 the friction to the point of breaking the bilateral relationship, which is already strategic, and it's not just strat- strategic, it is global strategic. It is exactly the concept of their partnership. 8:04 Um, the... In my view, what actually happened, Ira, it is that the 8:11 co- zero COVID policy damaged these supply chains mostly because of China and the policies rather than the relationship in between, right? 8:24 It doesn't, it doesn't mean that they didn't felt an disposition or a friction and tension on their, uh, uh, political relations, but I don't believe that that's the biggest impact in terms of trade. 8:37 Um, but I would say that it is very relevant to China, the personal relationships or what they call guanxi, and I believe that Lula is more posed to represent this image for them rather than Bolsonaro, and this would open more doors than the previous government. 8:56 And what have been the first signs from Lula, besides that promise to visit China? Did you see any other gestures to the Asian giant? 9:06 I believe the greatest signal that Brazil gave to China, it is to rescue and resume the participation of Brazil in most important, um, multilateral and regional instance, such as CELAC, for example. 9:21 And by recovering this Brazilian position on this multilateral, including Mercosur, for example, I believe that there is more room for engaging, um, other issues rather than only the commodities trade, for example. 9:39 Um, I would say environment, sustainability, there are issues of course, with Brazil coming back to the scene to discuss, uh, resolutions toward this situation that it is global, you know, per se. 9:53 I believe that Brazil can, mm, reproach China in a more sophisticated way than it was until now. 10:03 So that's the biggest sign I can see it is that they will try to bring back the concept of one global strategic partnership that was lost during, uh, Bolsonaro's government and it was more locked into this, uh, commerce and trade area, most especially the commodities. 10:22 You were talking about ways of improving that flow and not depending solely on commodities, but what Brazil could sell to China. 10:33 Um, I mean, do we have the technology to export products with a lot of, uh, value added, uh, to China? Or, I mean, what would you see in terms of how to expand the Brazilian portfolio? 10:48 Well, if I, if I had actually this answer, I would be selling it to the government right away. I, I mean, that's our big saga on trade balance with China, right? 10:57 It means the problem is not exactly to be, to export commodities. Um, United States the biggest ex- exporter, as many countries in Europe, in, and Australia, as you just said. 11:08 Um, but the problem it is not qualifying these exports, especially when we talk about agribusiness that, um, we have such a big, um, impact in terms of, uh, environment and it, it is the big issue, the, it is the big global issue. 11:24 There's no way for us to run out of, uh, resolving certain, um, problematics that we had here in Brazil during not only the last four years, but I would say even longer than that. 11:39 It is a problematic even with- in the country, inside, domestically, is something that we have to take account. 11:46 Uh, but I would say that we can diversify not only the exports in terms of commodities, paying a little bit more attention on the, uh, footprint of those, uh, supply chain to China. 12:00 I believe that that's gonna be important for China as well and, and the consumption patterns of, uh, the, the market, Chinese market also demands a little bit more of that awareness, I would say, on supply chains. 12:13 Uh, and that going to be even, you know, more relevant in the future. 12:17 But I believe that we could learn with China, for example, um- I have here in mind ideas as, uh, technological, uh, developments within universities that considers public/private partnerships. 12:32 Um, and there are some products even, uh, in the agribusiness sector that we could sell and could improve, let's say agric- familiar agriculture, uh, if we manage how to locate those investments. 12:49 But we have some products at, such as, uh, nuts or acai, which is also a, a seed, um, I would say wine, that there is one increasing, uh, consumption in China of certain products like that. 13:04 But I wouldn't say that that would be enough. 13:07 I think for, for our point of view, if we do wanna to at least decelerate, or the, the process of de-industrialization, we should do something more, some, um, other level of planning, I would say, on certain sectors that are gonna be, of course, on the threshold of humanity, I would say artificial intelligence, we are far from that. 13:32 But we could take a look, a closer look to what China, uh, is applying as dynamic to do partnerships as a state planning, not only government planning, to be able to re-industrialize, um, Brazil in a good direction, I would say, without necessarily not exporting anymore the, the, the commodities to China, but diver- d- diversifying not only partners in this, in this way I make sure that I'm saying that we don't need to choose between China and United States. 14:07 That is a debate that is posed, I believe is still not on this area. Uh, and, uh, and engage on improving technologies and the innovation sector, investing a little bit more on, uh, uh, 14:24 research and development in areas that we do have some expertise. For example, sustainability. Mm-hmm. 14:30 You know, going to, uh, communities to learn how they do their own dynamics of sustainability and apply that in to, to aggregate value on something that we can export to China, or trade with China, or do partnerships on this research to China. 14:49 Of course, there's also sectors that we don't much talk about in politics or economics that are, um, medicine, for example, you know, uh, biotechnology and all. But I believe that is also a sector we can- Yeah... 15:02 we can take a look. Now, you talked about balancing the relationship between the US and China. Um, how do you see that playing out during the Lula administration? Because, uh, Lula has a history of 15:19 keeping the US at an arm's length, of privileging South-South cooperation. Uh, but even 15:27 Jair Bolsonaro, who was antagonistic towards China, in one of the biggest issues to China, the, the 5G auction, uh, the Brazilian government sort of split the baby, right? 15:39 Uh, it did not allow Huawei, the Chinese giant, to be within government networks, 15:47 which was what the US and Western powers wanted, but at the same time did not ban Huawei, who will be able to, uh, operate private 5G networks. 15:58 Do you believe that that duality, that trying to cater to both sides will continue? How... 16:06 What can you tell us, uh, about what we can expect in that difficult balance, especially now the tensions between the two superpowers are growing and growing? 16:17 Well, I'm, I may sound a bit optimistic, but I do believe that there is still room for Brazil to be pragmatic on this sense that we still don't have to choose. 16:31 Maybe in terms of, um, small choices, I would say even, uh, the private sector choices on partnerships, uh, we, we don't have this double level planning which the state and the private sector are s- close or they have certain familiarity with the planning. 16:51 You know, so this is something for us to adjust to be able to see it in a better way and be able to apply the best choices. 16:59 I do believe that the tension between China and United States will continue for a while at least, uh, for the short, medium term. When I say long term to China, it may be too far. 17:12 I'm not talking about our long term, I'm talking about China long term. Um, 17:19 but I do believe that there is room to resume the presidential diplomacy that we've seen in the two first mandates of Lula, and that was lost a little bit with... 17:31 There, there was a tension even on this sphere of diplomacy of what it was the, um, peaceful diplomacy of Rio Branco in Brazil, and then we, we, we, 17:43 we've seen the rhetoric of, uh, globalism and, and, uh, I, those ideas more turning to the domestic side or closing in itself on hermetic view of international relations. 17:59 And we can resume this pragmatism even, and Brazil being, um, this peaceful theater for dialogue. 18:10 I mean, I, I maybe sound optimistic once more, but I do believe that if Brazil resume this path toward a possible green power, it's exactly the point where the three of them can actually talk and engage on a multilateral d- dynamism or- The dynamic of these new technologies or improving supply chain that, that may be the point of, um, an encounter of a, a point of convergence of politics of these three countries. 18:47 But what I think sometimes we fail to see is that these dynamics, they're not, again, once more, it's not this or that, it is this and that, right? It is something that we can apply. 19:00 There are the tensions and the frictions as there are frictions between United States and China, United States and Brazil, Brazil and China, and so on and so forth. 19:09 But, um, we can also manage to partner in some areas that are from common interests. 19:17 If we can, um, do sometimes like the Chinese do, that it is not focused on what do we have as a problem and friction, and a focus on what do we have as a common ground, as a common issue for dialogue. 19:33 Improving these common issues, we can somehow indirectly almost, uh, uh, soften the problems that we may have on this tresi- instance. 19:45 I think that the issue of sustainability and environment can be the common ground for these, uh, three parts. L- now you're talking about multilateralism, and [laughs] 19:58 that brings me to a question about Mercosur, which is Brazil's trade alliance with Argentina, Uruguay, and Paraguay. Because, uh, Lula has talked about strengthening this trade bloc. 20:12 Meanwhile, China has suggested it is open to making a free trade agreement with Mercosur. 20:19 Now, at the same time, China has also for months been engaged in talks with Uruguay about an independent deal with Uruguay, uh, even though Mercosur countries cannot sign deals on their own. 20:34 Uh, now let's suppose that, uh, Luis Lacalle Pou, the Uruguayan president, manages to convince his other three partners about, uh, that they should be signing an agreement with China. 20:49 And of course, that is a big if, because Argentina is very, um, resistant to opening up, uh, trade, uh, opening up the, the, its market to foreign, um, foreign producers. Brazil also to some extent. 21:08 But let's assume Lacalle Pou gets his points across and they are all on board. What are the risks and opportunities of having a trade deal with China? 21:20 First pointing out that China is also passing i- in terms of their, uh, diplomacy and their, their own dynamics of establishing strategic partnerships from one moment where they preferred to do bilateral, um, 21:38 relations rather than multilateral, and now they're going to a moment where they may prefer this multilateral, uh, dynamics. 21:50 And this issue with the Mercosur is one of them, where I do believe that it is still too early to engage on such a, an agreement because I feel that South American countries, they still need to organize 22:08 i- in a regional level how they're gonna manage investments or investment flows that comes from China, or how it's gonna be this free trade agreement, um, because they are diverse. 22:21 And being China, living in China and participating on certain academic environments, I see the, um, the levels that analyze South American countries, they still don't get it how diverse we are and heterogeneous. 22:39 And I think that can be maybe one element of risk, of not understanding social dynamics. I'm talking about, uh, communities. I'm talking about, um, uh, familiar agriculture. 22:54 I'm talking about levels of salary or even, uh, company dynamics, you know, that we have workers' rights and protests and all of this. 23:03 We already seen some problematic in the projects that, uh, China is doing in South American countries that may be a risk of, uh, summing up South American countries as one whole, uh, thing, you know? 23:16 And it is not like that. But I would go to another level of risk first and then go for the opportunities. It is that we may take investments from China, and they're gonna be especially on, um- Infrastructure... 23:30 infrastructure, there it is, um, that may be, uh, turning to the outside. They, m- they 23:39 possibly may help more China than South American countries themselves, in a sense that we're gonna build roads or railways or ports, even harbors, I don't know. 23:51 But they will serve for the solely purpose of, uh, taking products, commodities. That's what we're talking about. So there is impact of, uh, uh, uh, 24:02 the commodities and also the, the infrastructure that is, what, due to take this flow to China, the impact, the, the, the 24:11 environment impact of that, but also not end up engaging South American countries among themselves. 24:19 [laughs] It means that we'll serve for the purpose of China to receive, um, the flows of commodities earlier and cheaper, but not necessarily we are thinking about the regional voice that we can have on this free trade agreement. 24:34 I think we, we should take one step back and organize what would be our bargain, you know, with China on this free trade agreement, not be divided on that. 24:45 And that also, it is the risk of us not doing that Not, uh, organizing what would be our bargain power with China, but that's also the opportunity. 24:56 If we can sum up the ideas and, and the necessities as a region, and we can engage on this free trade agreement with China, not in the short term, I would say medium to long term, I, I, I don't believe that's now the time to do that. 25:11 We still need to solve some [laughs] domestic problems, all of us here in South America. Such as? 25:17 [laughs] Such as polarizations and even, even this view of China as being, uh, the big enemy, you know, the big global enemy. In spite of the fact, despite of the fact that we have good trade with China, we need to 25:36 see China as it is, or the representation of China in our trade balance, you know, on, on our export basket, on our products, um, levels of investment. 25:48 We need to understand China so we can be able to foresee the bargain that we may have with China in the future, and that's the opportunity that for us to have a comeback, to have a voice on multilateral decisions, and then China, as still identifying itself as one emerging country, mostly because of, uh, GDP per capita, th- rather than the power of its economy, even though now of course it's not as, uh, vital as, as it was before. 26:21 But that's the biggest, the big opportunity for us, to increase the voice, the voice in certain dynamics in the multilateral order, and engage in China on these spheres. 26:35 Uh, besides of course int- uh, even forums, uh, such as the BRICS or these bilateral connections with China. I, I believe- Mm-hmm... that we should step back, understand our dynamics, our regional dy- dynamics, um, 26:50 to the point of also not letting Brazil overshadow the growth of other countries, for example, and then we can think better on, uh, the, the levels of this partnership. 27:02 Now, Aline, we have talked a lot about Brazil, uh, but we should also talk a little bit more just about China if we're assessing Brazil-China relations, uh, especially because as we were saying, the fact that Brazil depends so much on selling commodities to China means we're overly exposed to internal hiccups, uh, 27:25 growth issues with China. 27:27 So I'd like to get your take on, uh, first, China has just posted new growth numbers, and the world's second-biggest economy reported 3% GDP growth for 2022, which in Brazil we would be jumping up and down [laughs] with that, but for China it's bad. 27:49 It is the lowest in many years, uh, mainly due to the COVID zero policy. Uh, but what do these numbers tell us? 27:59 Because, uh, the COVID zero policies have been relaxed, but we are also seeing a massive sanitary crisis coming from there. Uh, what does it bode for the near future, these growth figures? 28:16 I see as not only one impact of the COVID policy, but it was a trend that we've been analyzing for quite a while. Actually, it's part of the planning of the Politburo to apply, uh, uh, 28:33 certain incentives for population to grow, uh, to spend more. I, I... 28:42 The government, the Politburo believes there is still the, the demand and space for increasing domestic consumption. It's quite difficult to make Chinese spend, uh, as much as we spend in Brazil, for [laughs] example. 28:58 They tend much more to save and be able to accomplish and buy substantial possessions such as housing, you know, the, the real house sector. 29:10 Um, and to be able to sustain, for example, family and parents, grandparents. So there is a certain dynamic in this society that we're not quite aware of how it works. And, uh, 29:28 of course we shouldn't be worried. China is, uh, shrinking in terms of population. It, it means for us that China is losing what it was once its greatest, uh, attraction to the whole world, which means Chinese 29:45 domestic market. And so everybody wanted to go to China. 29:49 All companies wanted to open their, uh, franchising or joint ventures, which is more specific to China, uh, to be able to sell to this market, and now we are saying to those countries that the domestic market is shrinking. 30:02 What does it mean? It means that we should wake up for the way we rely on Chinese domestic market and Chinese demand to have a good balance in our trade. 30:15 I'm, I'm talking specifically about Brazil, but it also applies for other countries. Mm-hmm. You know, and also relying on Chinese investments. 30:24 Uh, but it's quite clear that the intention of China now, parting from the plan of dual circulation and focusing or trying to increase the domestic consumptions as percentage of GDP instead of investments, that was also something that pull, uh, 30:45 the price of commodities or our whole balance, you know, trade balance, and we have to look at that. And be worried because it's a new dynamic, and China will focus on their domestic situation. 30:59 So if it is necessary to decrease the economic growth, of course, as you said earlier, for China it is bad or the new normal is not very comfortable for them. 31:10 There are many challenges such as unemployment among youth, you know? But, uh, uh, uh- Yeah, especially because a lot of companies were forced to shut down for weeks, maybe without notice. 31:23 So m- a lot of layoffs we saw, right, this past couple of, of years. Exactly. Exactly. And now with the end of the zero COVID policy, uh, also people are getting sick. 31:34 And so if before they couldn't work because of the tracing, you know, the methods of the Chinese government to contain the spread of the virus, now they're, they're focusing, uh, on the treatments and the vaccination campaigns also, and the spread of the virus or living with this virus. 31:55 Of course, people are getting sick from the same company, so they cannot work, you know? Mm-hmm. So there is still a timing, a right timing for them to feel what it is the new 32:08 context they're living, and try to plan better what is the next move. Of course, I, I do believe that they already have some steps forward because I... 32:18 that's how I think Politburo works and the Communist Party in China works. They have certain scenarios. But it doesn't mean that is everything they plan goes as they thought it would be, right? 32:31 Of, of course, the, the, the rhetoric is not gonna be this. What they are gonna say is that that was on purpose, you know? Yeah. If something goes wrong, just say it was on purpose. There is a certain level of that. 32:41 It's difficult to manage 1.4 billion people, you know? But it is kind of puzzling, right? Because what we are seeing in terms of hospitals collapsing there- Uh, a, a good way for us to notice that China works in its own 32:56 way and its own, uh, pace because they, they look at other countries, they know what happened, they know what goes wrong and what can be done. It doesn't mean that the necessary, uh... 33:09 necessarily they will apply the same way, but they understand how it is, the dynamics. 33:13 They just choose to, of course, hold it obviously until the 20th, uh, Party Congress, that was for sure, that they would hold the, the zero COVID policy until then. 33:26 And then after the 20th Party Congress, what we saw are... were the protests and movements toward a faster flexibilization until the, the end of zero COVID, uh, policy. But I, I think for now 33:42 in political stance, they will try to keep up the stability the most as they can, and that's probably one of the, the, the, the, the reasons why Xi Jinping it is in power right now, because it is one unstable scenario abroad globally. 34:00 And so they would never ch- I believe that they would never change government on such an unstable environment, global environment. They would not. So it was quite clear for me that Xi Jinping would still stay there. 34:11 It doesn't mean that 34:13 he will stay such as the, the comparativeness they're doing with Mao Zedong, I think is a bit too much because they're more pragmatic, even though taking, uh, back the rhetoric of Marxism-Leninism, but still. 34:30 Um, but they're quite worried about these instance of unemployment, um, the shrinking of society, that they cannot make people spend more even, or there, there has been one certain resistance of improving, uh, the levels of domestic consumption. 34:49 So all of these indications, uh, those elements we should pay attention, not be too optimistic about Chinese growth anymore. They'd said couple of years ago even that would be a new normal. 35:04 Um, and I believe they will try, try to adjust on a more qualitative way domestic, uh, situation first, even though it's quite difficult. 35:15 So between their poultry growth and their shrinking population, do you think that, uh, Brazilian producers, especially commodity producers, should be bracing for the worst in at least the midterm? 35:34 I think it's gonna be a, a quite difficult scenario if we continue to rely on this sort of exports with China with a such a concentration of export basket. 35:46 And, um, you know, I think, I think it may, it may become more difficult because of our side than the Chinese side. I mean, we should have another strategy to deal with that because China is doing their thing. 36:01 It means they are gonna plan for how they're gonna deal with this new scenario and this new economic, uh, context, and we should do the same, you know? But by the other side, the pattern 36:17 of, uh, domestic consumption in China is also being modified. Uh, not for too long though. Uh, is still there the threat of the middle income trap. 36:30 Um, so maybe they will not grow infinitely, and we should pay attention on that as well. We should also change these, uh, patterns of exports to China. But at least for the short term, 36:45 the patterns of consum- consumption of Chinese market will maintain, which means consuming more, uh, protein on their dietary, uh, which of course would be good for us- For the short term, I would mark once more. 37:01 But we need a new strategy because China's not gonna consume commodities as it, it used to be when it was growing 14%. You know, it is now 3%, which is already less than before, so, you know, f- 5.5%. 37:19 It is not like this anymore. So we have to deal with this new reality of China to be able to adjust our new reality to that as well. 37:27 So I, I don't think that is a good scenario, but also there, there is still margin for, uh, reassuring certain sectors to be able to go on, let's say. 37:42 You know, we joke among ourselves that this show could be also called Bad News from Brazil Weekly. Thanks for keeping the spirit not veering so much from it. 37:53 [laughs] But, uh, Aline, thank you very much for joining us this week. Thank you. Thank you so much. It, I, I thought that I would sound optimistic- [laughs]... but it ended up being the other way around. 38:03 [laughs] It, it's our fault probably. [laughs] Aline- Thank you so much. Thank you. Aline Tedeschi holds a PhD in international relations, and she's also a professor at the Hunan Normal University. 38:17 Aline is a media manager at Platform Shumian and director of think tank Observa China and host member professor at BRICS The Catalyst. 38:28 And if you like Explaining Brazil, please give us a five-star rating wherever you get your podcasts. That takes only a second, and it will really help us reach a broader audience. 38:39 Or better yet, you can sign up for the Brazilian Report, the journalistic engine behind this podcast. We have a subscription-based business model, and your memberships fuel our journalism and keep us going and growing. 38:53 Thanks to our subscribers, we have been able to cover Brazil and Latin America extensively, and for our work, we have won or been shortlisted for many international awards. 39:05 In order to keep doing that work, we really need your support. Go to brazilian.report/subscribe. I'm Gustavo Ribeiro. Thanks for listening, and Explaining Brazil will be back next week. 39:23 [outro music]