Transcript 0:00 [upbeat music] Before we get started today, I'd like to thank our listeners and readers. As you might have noticed, we held a special election day live broadcast covering Brazil's runoff vote count in real time. 0:13 It was certainly a challenging project for our small newsroom, but we are extremely proud of how it turned out, and it wouldn't have been possible without the support of our audience. 0:22 And we'd also like to give a special shout-out to our supporters on Buy Me a Coffee. 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He's the first person in Brazil to win three presidential terms. 2:38 [speaking Portuguese] And in his first speech as president-elect, Lula said that he hadn't faced an adversary, but rather the power of the Brazilian state put to the incumbent's service to prevent him from winning. 2:54 [speaking Portuguese] And that's no overstatement because incumbent president Jair Bolsonaro used the public purse in his pursuit of re-election in a way that none of his predecessors had before, announcing eight initiatives targeting the poor since the October 2nd first round alone. 3:25 We commented on the results and their meaning for Brazilian democracy during our election day live broadcast, and you can check that out on YouTube, Twitter, or also in the show notes on our website, brazilian.report. 3:36 But today, we are talking about what came after the election. As was widely expected, Bolsonaro did not concede defeat, but unlike what was also widely expected, he hasn't exactly launched a coup attempt. 3:50 As a matter of fact, it took Bolsonaro two full days to utter even a single word about the election. My name's Ewan Marshall, editor of the Brazilian Report, and this is Explaining Brazil. 4:07 [upbeat music] Alex Hochuli is a political analyst based in São Paulo and is the host of the Bunkercast podcast, which discusses global politics, and Alex is no stranger to Explaining Brazil. Welcome back, Alex. 4:21 Always happy to be on. Thank you. 4:23 So Alex, Brazilian election runners-up aren't legally obligated to give concession speeches, but, you know, it's one of these political customs that help ensure the democratic process is happening as it should. 4:35 Now, we're recording this podcast on Tuesday evening. That's two days after the results became final, and we've just heard the outgoing president speak for the first time since his defeat. So tell us what he said. 4:47 Well, after keeping us waiting for about an hour and a half, he finally appeared and gave what must have been the most non-concession concession speech I've ever heard or many people listening had ever heard. 5:00 [speaking Portuguese] Bolsonaro did not really mention the election result. He didn't mention the winner, much less congratulate Lula. 5:14 What he did say was that the election process had irregularities, and then in reference to the truckers who have been blockading highways up and down the country for the past two days, he said that- [speaking Portuguese]... 5:28 peaceful protest is welcome but that the truckers should not adopt protesters supposedly used by the left, which create disruption for people. 5:45 So he didn't call off the protesters. He didn't recognize his defeat. 5:49 What he did do was swiftly set, step aside after a very short two-minute speech and leave it to his chief of staff, Ciro Nogueira, to say that the transition would begin promptly and would happen regularly, uh, with the participation of Lula's vice president Uh, Geraldo Alckmin, who has been charged with overseeing this transition. 6:09 So, uh, it was about as generous and a- as magnanimous as we would have come to expect from Jair Bolsonaro. 6:16 But the bottom line is that basically the election result has been accepted even if the, uh, still current president, uh, didn't say s- didn't say it in so many words. 6:26 And touching on the highway roadblocks you mentioned there, I mean, we've seen hundreds of small pro-Bolsonaro groups across Brazil with trucks blocking major roads trying to disrupt the country and calling for a military coup or, you know, what they call federal intervention. 6:40 [chanting] Do you think this protest movement would have reached the extent that it has reached had Bolsonaro simply conceded on Sunday night? I think probably not. 6:56 I think it was, to a certain extent, uh, a move on Bolsonaro's part to wait and see, to see whether his people would rise up, uh, in defense of his claims that the election was stolen and so on. 7:09 Um, so I, I definitely think that waiting, uh, furthered their cause, but I think, and we'll come on to discuss this, I'm sure, uh, that he didn't... 7:17 There were no further institutional cues or from those who actually hold power, whether it's men with guns or politicians, uh, that, uh, Bolsonaro's claims would actually be supported, and that any sort of, uh, 7:30 attempt to create even greater c- chaos all the way up to an attempted coup would actually happen or would actually be supported from above. 7:37 And staying with these protests, we've seen videos on social media of officers from the Federal Highway Police condoning the blockades, you know, chatting with protesters and in one case, even facilitating the roadblocks. 7:50 How important and how symbolic is that? 7:54 Well, it's worth, uh, recalling that we have been discussing the possibility of a, a sort of January 6th style insurrection and probably something potentially even more grave because of the degree of support Bolsonaro has amongst the police forces, particularly amongst the military police, but perhaps even more broadly than that. 8:16 What this election has revealed is that w- probably his strongest supporter was at the very top of the Federal Highways Police, who just before the election, called on people to vote for Bolsonaro and then carried out, uh, vote suppression tactics across the country, particularly northeast, particularly in, in, uh, areas which were expected to vote strongly for Lula, trying to prevent people from getting to voting booths or trying to dissuade them from even turning up to vote or having them arrive late after polls had closed. 8:47 We don't know what the effect of that ultimately was, and at the end of the day, Lula ended up taking the election. So, um, we don't need to spend too much time trying to figure out exactly what the effect was. 8:57 Uh, but the same police force came out again and, and made its stamp on this election after the results had already been known, exactly as you've said, by effectively, um, tacitly tolerating and perhaps even with, uh, you know, actively conniving with the truckers by allowing them to blockade roads. 9:18 Now, it's worth, um, making a comparison between this and any, for example, left-wing social movements like the Landless Workers Movements who sometimes in certain protests blockade roads. 9:28 They're met with, uh, some very serious violence, tear gas, uh, rubber bullets, and so on. 9:34 And in this case, the federal police was at the very le- the Federal Highways Police was at the very least, very hands-off, uh, as I say, uh, if, if not actively, uh, in league with, uh, with the demonstrators. 9:47 Also, many of the Bolsonaro allies who were elected this year, including the governors in São Paulo, Minas Gerais, and Rio de Janeiro, which are Brazil's three most populous states, they've basically been calling for the president to essentially hurry up and accept his defeat. 10:02 So, you know, what does that tell us? So this is crucial, and I think this was one of the early signs that there would be no real attempted coup, was that at an institutional level, Bolsonaro wasn't getting any backing. 10:15 In fact, much to the contrary, his... the speaker of the house, uh, the, the speaker of the lower house, Arthur Lira, was quick to congratulate Lula on his victory. 10:25 And as you've mentioned, the governors of, uh, of the three most important states who are Bolsonaro allies also recognized the result. 10:32 And I think that was very important in tipping Bolsonaro's hand or rather forcing his hand, um, and forcing him to eventually accept the result. 10:39 These elections have been very good for the Brazilian right, for the Bolsonaro-aligned, uh, right and the far right. 10:45 And so I think for a lot of them, they're kind of wanting to get on with governing whatever their plans might be or however destructive we may find them. 10:52 Um, and Bolsonaro was, to a certain extent, an, an impediment to that. 10:57 Um, so, you know, they were democratically elected and they want to get on with things and recognize that they probably had little to gain from, uh, any attempt to create chaos on Bolsonaro's part. 11:08 And we were all kind of expecting that Bolsonaro would challenge the results and directly incite his supporters to protest. 11:14 But as you said at the start, he didn't technically concede defeat, but he also didn't outwardly contest the election. 11:21 So, you know, none of those predictions that we made beforehand have happened, you know, at least not yet. So why do you think that is? 11:27 We can only guess what is going on, uh, in the barracks, for example, um, or, you know, in behind closed doors discussions with politicians. It's sort of an exercise in criminology. 11:39 And so in the lead-up to this election, we've been constantly discussing, and I think I've been on this podcast before to discuss very much this, about whether the military would back a putsch attempt by Bolsonaro, whether the military police, uh, would cooperate with, with Bolsonaro's demands and so on. 11:56 Um, so this has been a long time coming in terms of something that we've been pondering [chuckles] for, for a very long time. 12:03 And I think the result You know, we can only surmise from what has actually happened, and I guess we conclude that Bolsonaro didn't have the backing. 12:10 Bolsonaro didn't have the backing from generals, for example, who ultimately are more interested in retaining the military's, uh, status in Brazilian society and retaining the military's privileges, um, you know, for example, massive pensions for, you know, and, um, rather than, um, trying to seek to rule directly. 12:31 And I think it's al- another element which is important is that, you know, in, in previous points in Latin American history, there had been strong resistance from the working class, from peasants, from the left, and that, that sometimes led, or in many cases led the establishment to back these sorts of coup attempts, um, from right-wing politicians. 12:55 In this case, there was really no need to do that, and so Bolsonaro was perceived even by the establishment, even by the kind of establishment right, as the real agent of chaos, someone who ultimately has been bad for business. 13:08 Uh, and, and for that reason, I think all the signs from, um, across the institutions, establishment, um, armed body of men was that, you know, this isn't really worth the effort. 13:18 Right, with the idea being that Bolsonaro was useful to them while he had a power project in place, but now he's no longer the president. Is there any point in them sticking around? Well, exactly. Um, the, the 13:32 Bolsonaro had very weighty establishment backing in 2018, um, when he s- very much surfed this wave of anti-corruption and anti-Workers' Party sentiment. 13:43 Uh, and he was seen as someone, especially from the perspective of the financial elite, that would carry out the reforms that they wanted to see, privatizations and, uh, reform to pensions, and so on. 13:54 He actually delivered very little on those terms that the financial elite wanted to see. So they're very happy to discard with him given especially the consistent and constant political s- instability that he creates. 14:07 They're better off with Lula, who they know is someone who ultimately they can do a deal with. I think it's worth noting here that this is the first election that Jair Bolsonaro has ever lost. 14:17 I mean, he's held public office since the '90s, either in the Rio City Council, in Congress, or, you know, of course, in the presidency. 14:25 And throughout all this time in office, he's enjoyed parliamentary immunity as well as the privileged jurisdiction that federal officials have, which means that basically he can only be tried by the Supreme Court. 14:36 Now, all of that goes away on January 1st when Lula is sworn in as president, and there are multiple investigations hanging over Bolsonaro, for example, for interfering with federal probes, spreading vaccine misinformation, leaking sealed documents, and playing a role in massive online disinformation rings. 14:54 So how worried should the president be? Well, first off, I think it is worth reflecting a little bit more on the fact that, as you said, this is the first election he's ever really lost. 15:05 Does that make him a very successful politician or not? 15:09 My interpretation is that he's always relied on a very strong but limited base, so he was elected as congressman for Rio, very much dependent on, for most of the terms that he was elected, on, uh, military personnel who voted for him because he always defended their corporate interests, and he did very little other politically than that. 15:30 It was only, uh, it was only in the 2014 elections where he started to emerge as a more general nationwide figure and to adopt other agendas beyond just defending the military's, uh, corporate interests. 15:45 Um, and what is interesting about this is that 15:49 this is the first election, if we exclude 2018 when he was able to surf this wave of, as I said, anti-corruption and anti-Workers' Party sentiment, um, that he's actually faced the public on his record on a nationwide vote, and he's lost. 16:02 So in some sense, I think we conclude maybe that he isn't actually as successful or doesn't have as wide an appeal as, as he thinks. 16:09 Now, as to, uh, his own, uh, legal future, uh, I think it is not entirely clear what will happen. 16:17 But if we take history as some sort of record, there is obviously enough evidence against him to even arrest him now most likely. 16:26 But having enough on him has never been an, has never been a necessary reason for why institutions will act, that the public prosecutor will act to actually prosecute. 16:36 And we can even think, for example, that in the 2018 election, Bolsonaro was, um, elected on this wave of fake news and that there was illegal funding behind that, and so that might have brought some repercussions. 16:48 It didn't. Why didn't it? It's because, uh, the Supreme Court, for example, decided not to pursue that. Now, what was this election about? 16:56 This election was about stability fundamentally, and that's why huge swathes of the establishment ended up backing Lula, calling for a defense of democracy and the rule of law, and this includes top financiers and industrialists, as well as parts of, huge parts of the legal establishment, and so on. 17:11 So if you want stability and you want, uh, an end to the chaos of the past four years of Bolsonaro rule, um, then you'll try to probably pursue that as much as possible. 17:20 Arresting Bolsonaro at this stage, uh, I th- and prosecuting him, I think would be, um, something which would generate quite a lot of instability because we don't know how his supporters would react. 17:31 So my suspicion at this stage, unless Bolsonaro starts to really kick up a fuss and tries to, uh, drive on his supporters to, for example, continuing blockading highways, um, I don't think there will be any kind of judicial action against Bolsonaro for the time being. 17:46 They can always sit on that, and if they need to use the evidence, the, the whole range of evidence that they have against him at a future point in time, they can always do so. 17:53 Well, Jair Bolsonaro and the movement that formed around him has been the central force in Brazilian politics in the last few years, I mean, at least on the right of center. 18:02 What happens to it once it gets removed from power? So Bolsonarismo did not emerge fully formed, and it isn't, uh, a coherent unitary bloc either. We can think of what its institutional bases of support were. 18:15 For example, the military and the police, the, uh, financial elite who initially backed him, agribusiness, and, uh, the certain radical crusading parts of the judiciary known as lavajismo. 18:30 Uh, and then amongst civil society as a whole, you have the evangelical base, um, pursuing, you know, kind of conservative, a very conservative cultural agenda. Uh, you have supporters of an anti-corruption agenda. 18:44 You have, uh, law and order punitivists, and then you've got a, a nucleus of, uh, very hardcore authoritarians who, uh, are pushing for military coup. But that's a, that's a minority. 18:56 And so Bolsonaro was able to draw together, um, all this support, and actually one might add one, one other element, which is, uh, the new right that emerged in Brazil after the mass 2013 protests, which, uh, are probably more in favor of, uh, liberal or neoliberal economic policies. 19:13 And so Bolsonaro was able to draw all of these together. 19:16 Now, without Bolsonaro as president and without, uh, him as, um, you know, as a candidate for the next election and really trying to ride a, a, a, a really popular wave of protests and so on, we don't know what will happen, um, to the unity of, of that group. 19:32 Um, it- it's possible that, uh, some other section will try to s- uh, seek to lead parts of that. 19:38 Um, I suspect that Bolsonaro was the only one who was able to really unify all those blocs and was only able to do so because of the specific conditions of Brazil and the Brazilian crisis in 2015, '16, '17, '18. 19:54 Those conditions now are rather different, so it's not entirely clear who will lead the opposition against, uh, Lula. 20:01 We know that in Congress, uh, the PL, uh, the Partido Liberal, uh, Bolsonaro's party, has a very strong base there. 20:10 But it's unclear, for example, whether the leaders of, in those parties will, um, defer to Bolsonaro as the, as the sort of political leader, um, a- and it's important to remember that he'll be completely out of office at, at this time, um, or whether they'll seek to, um, kind of claim the leadership for themselves. 20:27 Um, if we want to draw a correlate maybe to American politics, you know, Trump has tried to remain the leader of Trumpism, uh, you know, this force which has taken over the Republican Party there, but there are alternatives that have emerged. 20:38 Ron DeSantis, for example, a kind of more mainstream, a little bit more of a traditional political figure there, has, uh, tried to rise to seize a lot of that Trumpist energy. 20:48 So it's not entirely clear whether something similar will happen in Brazil, nor who the candidates would be for that. 20:54 But I think Bolsonaro will remain a force in Brazilian society, but that doesn't mean it might not fracture into its different constituent parts. Alex, thank you very much as always. Thank you. 21:05 Alex Hochuli is a political analyst and host of Bunga Cast, which you can find wherever you get your podcasts. And if you like Explaining Brazil, please give us a five-star rating whenever you get your podcasts. 21:16 It only takes a second, and it will help us reach a broader audience. Or better yet, sign up for The Brazilian Report, the journalistic engine behind this podcast. 21:25 We have a subscription-based business model, and your memberships fuel our journalism and keep us going and growing. And thanks to our subscribers, we've been able to cover Brazil and Latin America extensively. 21:36 And for our work, we've been shortlisted for two entries in the Online Journalism Awards, which are decided by ONA, the Online News Association. 21:44 And in order to keep doing that work, we need your support, so go to brazilian.report/subscribe. I'm Euan Marshall. Thanks for listening, and Explaining Brazil will be back next week. 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