Transcript 0:00 [pensive music] Argentina could be set for an imminent political shift with the country's main opposition party landing a significant blow against the ruling Peronists last week, winning key races in a Congressional primary vote that is a strong indication of midterm results in November. 0:21 Primaries are mandatory in Argentina, meaning that they serve as highly representative opinion polls, giving us a very clear idea of where voters are leaning in the weeks and months leading up to an election. 0:37 Una derrota contundente se llevó el oficialismo argentino- In sports, they say that winning heals all wounds, and that could be true for politics, too. 0:46 That's why immediately after the results were released, rifts between President Alberto Fernández and his VP Cristina Kirchner began to appear. 0:57 Fernández was forced to reshuffle his cabinet amid a tug-of-war between his group and more leftist factions of Peronism. 1:06 He got rid of a number of allies, parachuting in Kirchnerite loyalists as cabinet chief, foreign minister, and agriculture minister. 1:16 The president's short-term problems are centered around how he will retain control and influence over his own administration. 1:25 Meanwhile, looking further ahead, Peronists are also facing an existential challenge, with polls showing that the dominant political force in Argentina is losing support among young voters. 1:39 Can Fernández avoid becoming a lame-duck president, and can Peronism reinvent itself? My name is Gustavo Ribeiro. I'm the editor-in-chief of The Brazilian Report. This is Explaining Brazil. 1:55 [pensive music] Alberto Fernández's rise to power in Argentina came after the sudden collapse of center-right former President Mauricio Macri's economic program, leaving something of a power vacuum. 2:15 Macri's biggest rival at the time was former President Cristina Kirchner, but her populist style scared off a majority of Argentinians, despite holding on to a strong minority of backers. 2:28 To overcome this rejection, Kirchner decided to take a step back. Instead of running for the top job, she threw her weight behind Alberto Fernández, a former aide- Es para mí-... turned centrist critic. 2:43 [clapping] Un inmenso orgullo, y créanme también lo siento como un reconocimiento político, que lo es, por cierto. He would be the candidate, and Cristina would run as his VP. 2:57 Now, while this proved politically astute in the short term, with Fernández cruising to election, it created a coalition that has proven very hard to manage, with lots of internal contradictions. 3:10 All of this seems to have exploded after an unprecedented defeat for the government in the country's midterm primaries, one of the worst in the history of Argentina's Peronist Party, which prompted Cristina Kirchner to openly demand changes from the president, forcing him to make sweeping changes to his cabinet. 3:33 To discuss what is going on in Argentina, we welcome Ignacio Portes, The Brazilian Report's Buenos Aires correspondent. Ignacio, welcome to our podcast. Thanks, Gustavo. How are you doing? I'm terrific. Thanks. 3:47 So Ignacio, how exactly did Peronism suffer such a loss in the primaries, and why is that so important? I mean, in Argentina, primaries aren't just primaries, right? Right. 4:00 Primaries in Argentina are mandatory, so everyone has to vote, and they're also mandatory for political parties, so all the parties have to take part in it, even if they agree to a unity candidate inside the party or inside the coalition. 4:13 So with both being m- mandatory for everyone, primaries act as a nationwide poll of a kind, uh, in which you can get a pretty good anticipation of how will the, the elections proper, the midterms proper in this case, uh, work out in the end in November. 4:31 So, uh, for example, if you go back to 2019 when Alberto Fernández won the presidential primary by a big margin over Macri, everyone just took it for granted that he was going to be the president. 4:43 And markets, uh, fell and, uh, uh, most people just saw it as a, as a, as a very, uh, good reflection of what was going to happen two months later. And this time is the same. 4:55 Uh, the primaries seem to mean that Peronism will lose in November. 4:59 And as for the reasons for the defeat, uh, most people cited the economy, uh, as the reason for what, for the vote they were going to cast before the, the election. 5:09 Uh, Alberto Fernández came to the government promising to make drastical changes, uh, in terms of the economic crisis that Argentina was suffering. 5:18 He promised a lot of things that were very hard to deliver on, uh, all of them together. 5:22 He promised higher salaries, ending inflation, re- and reactivating the economy, ending, uh, re- cutting unemployment, stopping the run against the peso, a- a- and, and so on. 5:35 And well, the, obviously the context of the pandemic made it, uh, much harder to accomplish any of those things. 5:40 But, uh, apart from that, even though maybe some people, uh, could be permissive, uh, could be, like, forgiving, uh, for, for any economic sufferings due to the, for s- part of the economic sufferings due to the pan- pandemic, uh, the government has struggled beyond that. 5:57 They, it has struggled to control inflation, promised that price controls would work, and they haven't. Inflation is still at 3% per month, about 50%. 6:05 Uh, and salaries are lagging, uh, strongly behind inflation, so poverty has increased from 35 to 42% during Fernández presidency. 6:14 Uh, unem- unemployment is up And generally there seems to be a lack of, um, new ideas or new perspectives or n- any idea of the future, that the future will get better, uh, economically, uh, under, under Fernandez, which is like the opposite feeling that he tried to create and that he kind of managed to create during the presidential election. 6:35 There's, there's a lot of pessimism about the future, uh, now, uh, compared to what he managed to create when he, when he was a rising political figure two years ago. So Ignacio, you mentioned the pandemic. 6:48 Argentina experienced what was perhaps the world's longest quarantine in 2020, and even if not everyone respected the rules, they were pretty strict. 6:59 And still recently, President Fernandez found himself amid a controversy around a dinner party to celebrate the First Lady's birthday, which didn't comply with COVID restrictions. 7:12 Does that also play a role in the vote, or is the result more an economic thing? I mean, it definitely helped. Uh, it definitely, uh, damaged his case, certainly. 7:24 Uh, I, I, both are still say that the economy is the main reason, but I would say that the, the pictures of, of the party in the presidential residency certainly helped create a climate in which it was, uh, very, uh, it was allowed to publicly criticize the president very strongly. 7:42 It, it kind of broke, uh, the spiral, a, a spiral of silence, uh, among people who are not strong, uh, enemies of the government, maybe that always criticize him. 7:53 But among the people who are in the middle, it allowed them to express everything they felt, uh, against the government that were, were maybe containing inside a little bit because of the circumstances, because of the pandemic, because of the, I don't know, the economic inheritance from Macri. 8:08 Um, the, the pictures, uh, re- it put him in a very hypocritical place after a year of insisting that people should be extremely careful, extremely, uh, prudent, extremely generous in, in not opening their, their shops, not, not going to visit their relatives, losing money, uh, 8:29 being at risk, uh, of, of, of, of not having the most basic things in life, right? He asked for big sacrifices, and, and he wasn't doing them. So that's, that's, uh, that certainly damages him. 8:42 And, and generally, uh, the president has seems to have a problem of, of exerting presidential authority. 8:49 Uh, he's, he looks like a bit of, a bit of a weak figure compared to Cristina Kirchner, his, uh, vice president and former president and very important political figure in Argentina. 8:58 So, uh, having, uh, this open the door for more mockery, for more parody of the president, for more, uh, looking at him as a, a bit of a joke, a public joke, uh, something to be laughed, scorned. 9:12 So that definitely doesn't help, uh, uh, before an election, right? And you wrote for our Latin America weekly newsletter that the Peronists might lose for the first time in a century control over the Senate. 9:27 How consequential is that for the remainder of the Fernandez administration and beyond? 9:33 In the short term, it means that, uh, Cristina Kirchner loses some of, some of her power because she's, uh, the Senate vi- vice president, and she has created, uh, a place where the, the, the place from which she works and which from which she exerts power now is the Senate. 9:48 Um, but, uh, maybe it has, it could have big even bigger consequences in the longer term after those two years because a potential non-Peronist government could have both chambers to control and to pass reforms, which has never happened. 10:02 And maybe for the time being, the government will struggle to pass laws. 10:06 It will have to look for the opposition to pass the budget, uh, to, for a couple of oppos- of guys in the opposition to, to join them to pass, uh, bills. 10:17 So it will be, it, it will make governability harder for Peronism certainly. 10:21 But I think the bigger, biggest change could be, uh, if we have a non-Peronist presidency, it would allow to pass all kinds of reforms that were never possible because Peronism always controls the Senate because of its strength in the provinces outside from Buenos Aires, especially in the north of the country. 10:38 The results rocked the coalition, right? I mean, in the wake of the defeat, what happened next? Yeah, it definitely, it definitely rocked the, the presidential, the government coalition. 10:49 They, they ma- They had the worst election, uh, probably in the history of, of Peronism, too. They just got thirty percent of the vote nationally. Uh, and obviously such a result is a complete shock. 11:01 Uh, and it was a shock for, for the vice president, for Cristina Kirchner especially. 11:07 Uh, so what happened immediately after the election was that Cristina Kirchner and some others in the ruling coalition demanded the president to make changes, to make strong cabinet changes, to make, uh, to show some kind of political initiative, to start looking like a strong presidential figure, to say, "Okay, we made mistakes. 11:25 We're going to change things economically in terms of, um, the fight against crime, in terms of fighting the pandemic." 11:31 Like, sh- show that you have political authority and that you will, that there's, uh, there's something that will change, that we are addressing the problems. 11:40 And Fernandez was, uh, always his timid self, uh, saying, "Okay, I'll do, I'll make changes, but maybe after November. We'll see. I'll, I'll study it." And, and Cristina said, "Oh no, we need changes right now." 11:54 So she forced, she forced his hand on Tuesday, two days after the, the defeat. 11:59 All her allies within the coalition tendered their resignations, uh, including ministers of his cabinets, um, all kinds of crucial political figures. 12:09 And Fernandez wasn't, President Fernandez wasn't noticed, notified about this, so he was in the middle of a, of a presentation. 12:17 He was speaking in public, uh, and, and he found out, uh, someone told him that, uh, that, uh- That all his ministers, that all his, all the ministers that come from Cristina's part of the coalition had just tendered their resignation. 12:30 It was a bit like, like Bush finding out about 9/11 [laughs] in public, right? That kind of, "What? What- what's happening?" And, uh, and so he was completely shocked and completely blindsided by, by the news. 12:41 For a few hours it seemed like he was going to resist, uh, Cristina's initiative, uh, to, to change the cabinet, but d- Cristina doubled down. 12:48 She wrote a public letter saying that she wanted these big changes, that she wanted more economic spending, uh, in the context of the pandemic, that she blamed Fernández for the defeat for what she said were his austerity policies. 13:03 Uh, she called for a new cabinet chief. She even named who the new cabinet chief should be. She called for some, uh, offi- officials of Fernández's government to be fired. 13:13 He targeted his, his spokesman sp- specifically, which his spokesman is very important because he was the one that is blamed for the leak of the pictures, and also, uh, Cristina thinks that he's, uh, talking badly about her behind her back, uh, to the press. 13:27 Uh, and, uh, in the end, Fernández couldn't stand so much pressure. 13:31 He feared that the government, that the ruling coalition would break, which was a reasonable fear at that point if he, if he didn't coalesce to some of Cristina's demands. 13:39 And, uh, 24 hours after the public letter of Cristina Kirchner, he basically caved in to most of what she asked. She, he changed, uh, his cabinet chief, he changed his, uh, foreign minister, he changed, uh, a lot of... 13:53 He, he fired lots of his allies from the government. Uh, most of the, of the outgoing ministers in, in the cabinet reshuffle, uh, are Fern- strong Fernández allies. 14:04 He also signaled that there will be some economic changes, although that's the least, uh, clear part of the reform because, uh, uh, responding to what Cristina wants would mean, uh, opening a conflict with the IMF, which wants austerity. 14:21 So that's the less clear part of the, of the changes that Cristina forced. Uh, but certainly she forced, uh, changes in her, in, in his cabinet. 14:31 So can we say that VP Kirchner is the one actually calling the shots in the government now? Uh, a little bit. I mean, sh- her... Yeah, she definitely showed that she has veto power, right? 14:45 Uh, more than, more than at, at any time in the past. Uh, but, uh, you can't exactly say that she has complete control of the government. 14:55 Even y- you can see that the people that Alberto Fernández put in, in, in place of his own allies are not necessarily all allies of Cristina Kirchner. Some of them are just Peronist governors, even right-wing people. 15:09 Uh, some of them not. Some of them are from f- closer to Cristina. Uh, but, uh, yes, she's... Her, her influence is undoubted. Uh, she's a more important figure politically than Alberto Fernández in Argentina. 15:22 That's very clear. Like, she, she knows that the votes, that, that most of the votes are hers. Uh, she knows that it's her political capital that it's a stake, uh, in Fernández's coalition. 15:33 And she says, "If, if I'm risking my political capital with this government, I'm going to try to call as many shots as possible." Uh, so when, when she's not heard, she starts to lobby to be heard. 15:46 So Fernández has some room to resist here and there and to moderate, uh, some of what she wants and to modulate it in some, in this way or the other. But, uh, yeah, she has definitely, uh, the most... 16:00 She's at, at her highest point of influence in Fernández's government right now, for sure. Right. So but these disagreements are nothing new in the Fernández-Kirchner relationship, right? 16:11 I remember reading about tension between the two of them just weeks into the Fernández administration. Well, it's not e- It's even not new within Kirchnerism. 16:21 Uh, Cristina had, uh, rebellions from their own vice presidents. I- in- in her first term in charge in 2007, her vice president ended up being part of the opposition. 16:31 Julio Cobos from the Radical Party, uh, voted against a, a very important, uh, tax, uh, foreign, uh, duties on, on, on ta- on, on exports, on, uh, a- agricultural exports in 2008, and this, uh, sparked a, a, a divide between president and vice president in Cristina Kirchner's government when she was the president. 16:54 But, uh, she has promised now that she won't be like that. She said, "I will never do what was done to me. I will never completely break the coalition," she said in her open letter. 17:03 Uh, so I mean, she is acting a little bit like she's, uh, government and opposition at the same time. Like, I won't break the coalition unless it's my way. A little bit, yes. 17:17 Uh, um, but I think sh- what she will continue to do, uh, during the last two years of, of government is to 17:26 continue to criticize, uh, Fernández here and there for, uh, a few things, uh, especially the economy, uh, in order to preserve her political capital, uh, as much as she can from a government that is suffering a lot, whose public image is, is, is going down. 17:42 Uh, so she wants to keep some distance in order to s- when that, uh, whenever the government finally loses the presidential election or fails or has a spiraling inflation that starts to be catastrophic or whatever, um, bad things that could happen and end up happening, she can say, "Okay, you know that I always criticize this. 18:01 I'm not, uh... I w- I named him because I had no other choice, but you know I, I, I, I always stood against the, the bad parts of this government." So she will continue to be, 18:12 uh, part of the government forcing changes, but also part of the, between inverted commas, opposition, uh, criticizing it. It's, it's a, it's a, it's a political strategy. 18:22 Exert as much influence as possible, but without accepting, uh, all of the bad consequences of being a part of an unpopular government. It's, it's this, the two things at the same time. 18:33 You mentioned that Cristina wants more public spending to counter the crisis, which goes against the terms of a deal with the IMF. What's at stake economically speaking? 18:43 Well, uh, Argentina m- m- Economy Minister Martín Guzmán, uh, st- agreed in, last year to a restructuring of, uh, the debt with private bond holders, uh, who, uh, sold Argentina a lot of debt, six, like around $60 billion in debt during, uh, Macri's administration. 19:03 Uh, but there's still $44 billion pending to be solved from the IMF, uh, rescue package, uh, from 2018. 19:12 Uh, and the IMF, uh, as opposed to the private bond holders, uh, has more explicit, uh, qualitative, uh, demands on what the government should do, uh, before agreeing to a restructuring. 19:25 They demand, uh, specifically that you do, that you follow this or that economic policies before agreeing to restructuring the, their debt. 19:35 So they are demanding, although the, the, the terms are not known in public, the terms of the discussion. 19:41 This is all press leaks, uh, because the, they are, the government is being as secretive as possible about the negotiations with the IMF. It fears that they will be unpopular. 19:50 Uh, but they are certainly demanding a little bit more austerity from, from Martín Guzmán, and Guzmán is, is, agrees with this a little bit, too. He doesn't want zero deficit, but he wants a smaller deficit. 20:02 And, uh, definitely also less money printing, uh, as, as, as, um, as, um, 20:10 conditions to, to agree to kick the debt that Argentina has to repay four years down the road, uh, yeah, I- in the future as, as he, as he did with the private bond holders. 20:22 But, uh, Cristina at the same time wants to jack up public spending to, to try to recover some of the popularity. 20:29 So there will certainly be a conflict, but Cristina, uh, doesn't want to, to kick off Guzmán from his, from, from the government. She knows that, uh, it's risky. 20:40 She knows that it could trigger a run, another run against the peso and two years, surviving two years more with, uh, with another strong run against the peso will be very hard for her. 20:48 So again, there she's between, uh, if she continues with austerity policies, it will be unpopular, but if she jacks up public spending, uh, it might trigger a run against the peso. 20:59 Sh- so what she's doing is just complaining in public about, uh, the situation to keep her distance with the, with the unpopular government and preserve her political capital. We'll be right back. 21:13 [upbeat music] As you know, The Brazilian Report is an independent news outlet that lives off subscriptions. So you can support our independence by choosing one of our plans for the best content about Brazil in English. 21:29 And if you have already subscribed, then you can also buy us a coffee with a small donation starting at $4 and going up to whatever your budget and your heart allows. 21:38 You can help us refill our coffee mugs to continue covering Brazil. Just go to buymeacoffee.com/brazilianreport, buymeacoffee.com/brazilianreport. 21:51 [upbeat music] So we're back with Ignacio Portes, our Buenos Aires correspondent. 22:09 Ignacio, one cannot understand Argentinian politics without understanding Peronism. 22:14 And there is a great quote from the man himself, Juan Domingo Perón, when he was interviewed in 1972 and described the country's political landscape at the time. 22:25 He said that Argentina was split equally into three factions; radicals, conservatives, and socialists. So the journalist piped up, "Mr. President, so where are the Peronists?" 22:39 To which Perón replied, "Well, we are all Peronists." So could you explain a little bit where Peronism comes from and how it took such a firm hold on Argentina, and who are today's Peronists? Right. 22:56 Well, th- that phrase from Perón comes from a moment in which Peronism was extremely popular in Argentina in the '70s, uh, after, uh, 20 years of being banned. Uh, and, uh, 23:07 there was like a Peronist effervescence in, in the country, and, uh, everyone was a Peronist in, in some way. 23:15 [laughs] And it's a very common thing in Argentina, uh, to, uh, hop back, hop onto the back of Peronism when, when you feel like seven, 60, 70% of the country is Peronist. 23:30 If you're a, a right-winger or a left-winger, you start to pretend that you also are a Peronist, of course. Uh, but from the inside, then you try to, to make the changes that you want. 23:42 You, you try to u- you start to use Peronism to, uh, liberalize the markets, or to try to launch a Marxist revolution, or to try to combat the communists or whatever. 23:53 Uh, you just say, "Yeah, I'm a Peronist, of course," and then you, you impose your political beliefs over that. Uh, so that, that's, that's happened a lot in Argentine politics. 24:02 So I think that the, the joke comes from, a bit from there. Uh, why, why Peronism is so popular? Well, uh, you have to go a little bit to the origins of Peronism in 1945 [pensive music] 24:14 in the aftermath of the Second World War, and, uh, with Argentina, uh, recovering, uh, from, from years of economic crisis. 24:24 And now with a little bit of money to spend, uh, but with a very poor and very downtrodden working class after 10, 15 years of, of misery really, uh, and hard work, uh, with no redistribution of, of money at all. 24:40 And after even more, 24:42 like a century, you could argue, of Argentina being a developed country, but with a lot of inequality and a lot of looking down elitist views on the working class and looking down on overcoming people, this colonel comes to power, comes to 25:01 He gets control of the Ministry of Labor in Argentina in 1943-44 and starts pushing for the reforms that unions always wanted, that the anarchist, communist, socialist unions always wanted in Argentina, the Labor Party. 25:17 They always demanded, well, paid holidays, better salaries, the right to strike, and so on. 25:27 And Perón said, okay, this is a big movement and this is important and I need to make these people part of my political ambitions. And so he joined forces with them. 25:38 And from within the military, he started becoming like the nexus between the military and labor. 25:46 He became this massively popular figure that eventually, also due to the military's refusal to join the Allies in the end of the World War, 26:09 he wanted to maintain Argentina's neutrality. 26:12 Eventually, the ruling classes of Argentina put him into jail in 1945, and the working classes that he had been building up as allies marched to the Plaza de Mayo, to the central square in Argentina, and demanded his liberation. 26:30 And in the end, he was liberated and he spoke from the balcony of the Plaza de Mayo. 26:38 Thank the people for freeing him and then won the elections a few months later and became the most popular president that Argentina had 27:07 in its history, completing all those labor reforms and stimulating the economy and so on. 27:14 And for 10 years, he was a very popular figure, right up to the In the last few years, not so much because there started to be economic problems. And he started to build a myth around his figure. 27:28 It started to be like a larger-than-life figure, especially when he was ousted in a coup in 1955, a very, very violent coup in 55. In the build-up to the coup, there was the Marine bombed the Plaza de Mayo. 27:44 It killed hundreds of people. It persecuted every Peronist. There were clandestine shootings. Of Peronist sympathizers throughout the two decades that Peronism was banned from 55 to 73. 28:01 Peron went to exile in Central America and then to Spain. And he started to become this forbidden but attractive myth that 28:13 reminded people of a time in which they were happier, especially the working class, but also young people, young leftist people with students that were tired of military repression and 28:29 moralism within the military. Peron seemed to represent the answer to all of that. 28:36 So by the 70s, when Peron came back, he came back with massive Peronist support from Peronist armed groups who were formed during the dictatorship years and with a strong support from unions too. So by 72, 73, 28:54 which is the time when Peron says that phrase, everyone or 60, 70% of the country felt like they were Peronists, right? 29:02 And but that government, when Peron came back to the country, that government lasted very little. 29:27 There were right wingers and left wingers within his coalition and they started infighting very violently. There was a very violent decade in Argentina and there was a lot of economic crisis too. 29:38 And eventually it ended in another even more violent dictatorship in 76, between 76 and 83 with, you know, well, this is pretty well known, but the concentration camps and so on in the 70s. And anyway, eventually 29:56 Peronism returned to power, but in a very different fashion in the 90s, being a right wing neoliberal reformist party under Carlos Menem. Part of what we were saying that it can take any shape or form Peronism. 30:12 The 80s were had a social democrat government in Argentina that ended in hyperinflation, horrible ending. And Peronism in the 90s was kind of supported by the union still, but in a very right wing fashion of 30:27 let's reform markets, let's open up to foreign trade and so on. And the final form of Peronism is another return to the left in the 2000s under the Kirchners, 30:41 repudiating the Menem's, Carlos Menem's neoliberal decade of the 90s and saying, no, we should return back to Government intervention in the economy, public spending, um, social security, uh, rights, uh, union strong, 31:00 uh, union negotiating rights, uh, and so on, uh, and strong s- uh, s- 31:10 where people go to look for, to find jobs. 32:38 Uh, if you are from the interior of the country, you go to the outskirts of Buenos Aires to look for a job. That's very common. 32:43 Uh, so there was part of it, of their base, and also in the north of the country, uh, which is the poorest area of the country, uh, maybe more conservative socially, but Peronism has no problem with that. 32:53 It's very adaptable. Uh, but it's also very popular in the north, and the, the opposition made very big strides in all those areas. Uh, it won in six out of seven districts in greater Buenos Aires. 33:06 It didn't win in the most working class district of all, in the, the, the south of Buenos Aires province, of greater Buenos Aires, sorry. Uh, it lost there, but by a small margin, the opposition. 33:16 Uh, Peronism barely held to that, uh, working class stronghold. But in the rest of Buenos Aires, it lost in... 33:23 And in the north it lost, uh, quite a few provinces that it never usually lost, in Chaco Province, Jujuy Province, all very, uh, rural, poor provinces, right? Uh, so yes. 33:36 And, and another interesting sign of the, their loss of support among the working class, which shocked many people, was that in the south of the, of Buenos Aires city, which is, uh, a little bit of a working class place, too, uh, the southwest of the, of the city, uh, the most hard right candidate of them all, Javier Milei, had, did an, had an even better election than in the richer parts of the city. 33:59 So it seems like there's a new, uh, discourse, uh, that, that is being, that, that people are finding attractive in the working class, that it's not so much, "Okay, we need help from the state, but I don't, I don't want help. 34:12 I just want to have a job and win the bread for my family myself, and I want to have, like, personal dignity and, uh, and, and do things by myself. I just want the state off my back," and that kind of thing. 34:25 So it seems like we're having, um, a kind of paradig- paradig- paradigmatic shift, uh, in, in many people's heads. 34:34 Uh, pe- um, candidates, uh, center right and right-wing candidates are going to the, to shanty towns, to, to places where you would expect Peronism to win and, and are doing rallies there, are, uh, talking to poor people, and they are, they are finding a little bit of, of positive response there. 34:53 Uh, both are, both, both the hard right and the center right are finding that they are making inroads, right, into places that, where they didn't used to. They, they sometimes they couldn't even come in, right? 35:04 Uh, they were, [chuckles] they were, it was a hostile pra- place for them. So they are gaining definitely ground among the working classes and also among the youth. 35:13 Um, uh, there, there's, there's, uh, it's harder to, to measure this in terms of the vote, but yes, there are, there are polls that show that if you ask the youth what they think of the government, their, their view of the government is, is growing, 35:29 uh, into a more negative direction. It's, it's, it's, it's started, it's, it's countercultural now to, to be, 35:38 to not be left-wing, to not be progressive, to, to start n- laughing a little bit about the progressive discourse because it's started to be associated with a government that is not working, with empty promises from politicians. 35:51 So now, uh, if you hear, uh, some politician talking about how important it is that the state helps people and that it helps you fight the powerful 36:02 businessmen, while you actually don't even have a job, so there's no business might, businessman or boss to fight. 36:09 Or, uh, you have big problems economically and the government says, "Okay, but now we are, uh, our, our schools are teaching gender inclusive pronouns," or whatever, uh, you start to, to find this, that, uh, it's not resonant with, with your reality, right? 36:26 Uh, so the, the progressive causes are, uh, very distant to, to, especially to working class reality, but also a little bit to the youth, and the government doesn't really have a good answer to that. 36:37 It's just, uh, it's losing its base to, to other, um, alternatives. Not just politically, but, like, culturally. It's a little bit like what happened, uh, in the United States in the last years of Obama, right? 36:50 In the build-up to the Trump years. It started to be countercultural to be, to be right-wing. In Brazil, we have seen this invasion of American political traits and codes, both on the left and right. 37:02 And Jair Bolsonaro and his supporters are a prime example of that because they reproduce much of the messaging of Reaganite rhetoric from the 1980s United States, in which they say that the state is not part of the solution, but actually the problem itself. 37:18 Do you observe a similar thing happening in Argentina? Because this kind of approach may be tricky in country with massive poverty levels, such as Latin American countries. 37:30 But still, you said something that struck me, that workers think that they just need the state to get off their backs so they can thrive by themselves. Yes, there's a little bit of that. 37:40 It's, it's gaining ascendancy that, that, that discourse, that kind of Reagan discourse. And also, I mean, it's not the first time that it happens in Argentina. It happened in the '90s. 37:49 Uh, the, the, the correct thing to say in the '80s i- in, among the middle class intellectuals was, "Okay, the state n- the state needs to help the poor, uh, the state needs to be, uh, understanding," but the state wasn't working at all. 38:04 Nothing was working. There was hyperinflation. They, they could give you money, but money worth w- was worth nothing. Uh, they could offer, uh, free services, but services weren't working. 38:14 So there was kind of a rebellion, a, a, a strange alliance between the very, very richest people in the country and part of the working class against, uh, the, um, uh, intellectuals, universities, uh, to, to just unleash right-wing capitalism to the country, which had, 38:32 uh, massive transformative consequences, many of them negative. There was high unemployment, there was, um, [lips smack] uh, high inequality, uh, and so on. 38:42 But, uh, also there was a period of capitalist growth, and some people benefited from it. Uh, so there's kind of a revival of that. Like, like the bad part of that has been forgotten. 38:53 The, the, the Menem years ended up extremely badly with a massive financial crisis. The, the country opened up to extreme volatility from, uh, global financial markets. 39:05 Uh, every, every crisis outside of Argentina had massive impact in Argentina. 39:09 Whenever there was a problem in Russia, there was a problem in Mexico, there was a problem in the US, Argentina had a massive problem too, because capital was scared and, and flew away from the country, and we had all kinds of, um, crisis stemming from that. 39:24 So the Kirchners were a reaction to that, to, "Okay, we're gonna insulate the country from, from this, um, crazy fina- financial world, and we're gonna offer protections to the working class." 39:34 But now all this bad part has been forgotten again because we're again seeing the, the problems of the left, the typical, um, 39:43 uh, you know, state inefficiencies, overpromising, the promising things that you can't deliver. 39:49 So what you're saying is, like, Argentina stumbles from crisis to crisis, shifting between the left and right in this never-ending pendular movement. Yeah, a little bit. A little bit. I, I... 40:01 It, it seems like the, like the atmosphere is welcoming, the, the cultural atmosphere is welcoming back, uh, th- this, uh, Reagan/Menem '90s model a little, a little bit again. We'll see what final shape it takes, right? 40:15 Because there's opposition from the center right and from the right. 40:17 We'll see what kind of, of, of, of opposition we'll get, or maybe Peronism survives in some way and adapts, and in these last two years, against, uh, all odds, it seems at the moment, finds a new shape in these two years that they have left and manage to, 40:33 to continue in government somehow. But, uh, like the final form of this reaction to, to these years of progressivism is still to take shape, right? 40:42 We still don't know what final shape it will take, but it does seem like, uh, we are going into, uh, an, a change of era, and, uh, it seems like an end to this 20 years of the center left to left domination of the political discourse, and we're going to go in a right-wing direction for a few years now. 41:04 [gentle music] Ignacio, thank you very much. Thank you, Gustavo. Pleasure. And if you like Explaining Brazil, please rate us with five stars. That will help more people find out about this show. 41:17 Or you can sign up to the Brazilian Report, the journalistic engine behind this podcast. 41:23 We offer a seven-day free trial, no strings attached, which gives you access to the site for a week without the need to insert any credit card details whatsoever. I'm Gustavo Ribeiro. Thanks for listening. 41:35 See you next week. [outro music]